

# **CIVILIAN-MILITARY COOPERATION IN THE PREVENTION OF DEADLY CONFLICT**

## **IMPLEMENTING AGREEMENTS IN BOSNIA AND BEYOND**

**GEORGE A. JOULWAN AND  
CHRISTOPHER C. SHOEMAKER**

**DECEMBER 1998**

### **DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A**

Approved for Public Release  
Distribution Unlimited

**A REPORT TO THE  
CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON  
PREVENTING DEADLY CONFLICT**

**CARNEGIE CORPORATION OF NEW YORK**

Carnegie Corporation of New York established the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict in May 1994 to address the looming threats to world peace of intergroup violence and to advance new ideas for the prevention and resolution of deadly conflict. The Commission is examining the principal causes of deadly ethnic, nationalist, and religious conflicts within and between states and the circumstances that foster or deter their outbreak. Taking a long-term, worldwide view of violent conflicts that are likely to emerge, the Commission seeks to determine the functional requirements of an effective system for preventing mass violence and to identify the ways in which such a system could be implemented. The Commission is also looking at the strengths and weaknesses of various international entities in conflict prevention and considering ways in which international organizations might contribute toward developing an effective international system of nonviolent problem solving.

Commission publications fall into three categories: Reports of the Commission, Reports to the Commission, and Discussion Papers. Reports of the Commission have been endorsed by all Commissioners. Reports to the Commission are published as a service to scholars, practitioners, and the interested public. They have undergone peer review, but the views that they express are those of the author or authors, and Commission publication does not imply that those views are shared by the Commission as a whole or by individual Commissioners. Discussion papers are similar to Reports to the Commission but address issues that are more time-sensitive in nature.

Additional copies of this report or other Commission reports may be obtained free of charge from the Commission, or they may be downloaded from the Commission's Web site: [www.ccpc.org](http://www.ccpc.org)

Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict  
1779 Massachusetts Avenue, NW  
Suite 715  
Washington, DC 20036-2103  
Phone: (202) 332-7900 Fax: (202) 332-1919  
e-mail: [pdc@carnegie.org](mailto:pdc@carnegie.org)

# **CIVILIAN-MILITARY COOPERATION IN THE PREVENTION OF DEADLY CONFLICT**

## **IMPLEMENTING AGREEMENTS IN BOSNIA AND BEYOND**

**GEORGE A. JOULWAN AND  
CHRISTOPHER C. SHOEMAKER**

**DECEMBER 1998**

**20000112 097**

**A REPORT TO THE  
CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON  
PREVENTING DEADLY CONFLICT**

**CARNEGIE CORPORATION OF NEW YORK**

Copyright © 1998 by Carnegie Corporation of New York.  
All rights reserved.

01 00 99 98 4 3 2 1



Printed in the United States of America

---

---

# CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	v
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	i
Principles of Civilian–Military Implementation, 2	
The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 3	
Into the Future, 5	
Beyond Bosnia, 6	
CIVILIAN–MILITARY COOPERATION IN THE PREVENTION OF DEADLY CONFLICT	9
Suppressing the Re-emergence of Conflict, 10	
What Is to Be Done? 12	
Postconflict Reconstruction and Preventing the Re-emergence of Violence, 12	
Levels of Management, 15	

Principles of Civilian–Military Implementation, 16	
Civilian–Military Implementation: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 26	
Normalization: Next Steps in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 37	
Beyond Bosnia and Herzegovina, 45	
Conclusion, 48	
NOTES AND REFERENCES	49
MEMBERS OF THE CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON PREVENTING DEADLY CONFLICT	53
MEMBERS OF THE ADVISORY COUNCIL	54
ABOUT THE AUTHORS	56

---

---

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

WE WOULD LIKE to thank the staff of the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, particularly Jane Holl and Tom Leney, for their contributions to the ideas expressed in this paper and for their energetic assistance in bringing the project to fruition.

---

---

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

As THE WORLD comes to grips with the realities of a new international system, the prevention of deadly conflict has become a focus of efforts to secure a peaceful, prosperous environment. Conflict prevention is a daunting and complex challenge, embracing operations to avert war, to contain a war once it has begun, and to suppress the renewal of war in the aftermath of a cease-fire or a peace accord.

The last of these cases—the suppression of renewed conflict—is particularly problematic, because operations are often carried out in an environment of overt hatreds and deep-seated suspicions in the midst of economic and social ruin brought on by the war. Thus, a range of economic, political, military, and social issues must be addressed virtually simultaneously.

Suppression of renewed conflict demands, at its most basic level, enlightened and imaginative implementation and coordination of both the civilian and the military aspects of the peace accords. Civilian–military implementation thus becomes the *sine qua non* for sustaining the cease-fire and for building an enduring peace.

In this paper, we will present a set of principles for civilian-military implementation of peace agreements, outline structural-functional imperatives for integrating and coordinating the efforts of the international community, and suggest that the key to prevention of a renewal of deadly conflict lies in the establishment of an effective civilian-military implementation staff (CMIS).

## PRINCIPLES OF CIVILIAN-MILITARY IMPLEMENTATION

To focus the efforts of the international community on building a durable peace and as the foundation for an effective CMIS, four basic principles must be applied:

1. *Clarity of Mission and Objectives.* Efforts to suppress renewed conflict will only succeed if there are clearly stated missions for the program as a whole and achievable objectives for each participating organization and institution. In the first instance, these missions and objectives derive from a lucid understanding of the peace accord that undergirds the entire program. These missions and objectives must be further supported by specific tasks to be fulfilled by each of the participants—tasks that provide a road map to achieving overall objectives and tasks by which progress can be measured.
2. *Unity of Authority and Integration of Effort.* Conflict suppression is a multidisciplined operation, requiring a thorough integration of functions to be executed by diverse organizations. The establishment of an overarching integrating structure is a key step in carrying out the practical, day-to-day management of conflict prevention operations as well as achieving more general objectives. Yet, the creation of an integrating structure is among the most daunting challenges the international community confronts. In many instances, autonomous organizations must surrender a measure of independence. Civilian and military leaders must learn to work closely together and to overcome the hostilities and suspicions that often separate them.
3. *Timely Political Decisions and International Commitment.* Conflict suppression operations generally occur in an environment of great flux, requiring rapid decisions framed in the context of overall objectives. Such operations demand that the decisional process be streamlined and responsive.

Moreover, each participating organization must understand what

political and resource commitments will be required to meet its objectives. This understanding provides the basis for both the commitment and for the conditions under which the commitment may be ended. The establishment of arbitrary timelines for the withdrawal of peacekeeping forces or other international organizations is nearly always counterproductive. Commitments must be made to the satisfaction of objectives, not to predetermined timelines.

4. *Robust and Realistic Rules of Engagement.* Rules of engagement—the predetermined and approved conditions under which force may be employed—are essential to successful civilian–military implementation. They provide local commanders with flexibility and credibility in enforcing a peace agreement.

These four principles form the foundation upon which the re-emergence of conflict may be suppressed and for the development and implementation of conflict prevention operations and their supporting integrating structures. They are applied during each of the three phases of a conflict suppression operation:

1. *Transformation*, during which the belligerents are separated, heavy weapons controlled, and lines of demarcation established. The principal thrust during this phase is to keep the warring factions apart, so the primary efforts are devoted to military peacekeepers.
2. *Stabilization*, during which the military requirements gradually diminish as the cease-fire becomes institutionalized. Implementation of civilian aspects of the peace accord now begin to assume a much more prominent role as the foundations for an enduring peace are established, institutions are built, and policies and procedures are developed.
3. *Normalization*, during which the implementation of both the military and civilian aspects of the peace accord is completed, external military presence is no longer required, international civilian agencies and institutions complete their work, and responsibilities for governmental and security functions are assumed by the country itself.

## THE CASE OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Few of the major conflict prevention operations are more illustrative of the demands for effective civilian and military implementation than Bosnia and Herzegovina in the aftermath of the war. In Bosnia, we can see

not only the value of the concepts outlined above, but also the practical policy implications as the international community moves toward the next phase in its involvement.

From Dayton to the NATO Implementation and Stabilization Forces (IFOR and SFOR), we find an uneven application of the four basic principles and, as a result, significant areas of discontinuity in the international community's efforts to suppress a renewed conflict. In those instances where the principles were rigorously applied—such as during the period before and during NATO air strikes in response to Serb attacks against Zepa and Srebrenica—international operations were generally successful. But, from Dayton forward, we find substantial deficiencies in each of the four principles, some of which were rooted in the Dayton Accords themselves. The primary focus of the accords was to stop the fighting, and less attention was given to building the peace for the long term.

The most significant deficiencies in the four principles lay in the absence of a mechanism to effect integration of civilian and military implementation programs at any level—strategic, operational, or tactical. While the military implementation requirements, and the NATO structure, were relatively straightforward, the implementation of the civilian aspects of the accords became far more problematic. The High Representative's mandate was vague and ambiguous, he was accorded no formal authority over the various organizations and agencies involved in the civilian implementation.

There was no formal integrating structure established at any level, and no means by which the military and civilian implementation plans and activities were reconciled and coordinated. The integration that did occur was primarily at the operational level—in Bosnia itself—and occurred as a result of *ad hoc* arrangements between the commander of IFOR/SFOR and the High Representative.

As a result, the military aspects of Dayton—particularly during the initiation phase—were largely fulfilled. The factions were separated, inter-entity boundary lines were established, heavy weapons were collected, and the peace was maintained. But the IFOR/SFOR, as successful as it was during the transformation phase, was unable to create the conditions that would allow the military to withdraw. The military can prevent war, but it cannot build peace.

The implementation of the civilian aspects of Dayton—a far more daunting challenge—lagged considerably behind the success of IFOR/SFOR. The weakness of the High Representative's mandate, the absence of integrating structures at the strategic and operational levels, and the plethora of international organizations, NGOs, and private companies involved, all created an almost unmanageable situation for civilian implementation.

Because of this dilemma, there is no clear path from stabilization to normalization and no prognosis as to when the very visible military commitment to peacekeeping in Bosnia and Herzegovina can be brought to a close. The conditions that undergird transition to normalization—an effective program of civilian implementation and the development of indigenous capabilities to assume increasing responsibility for governance and security—have not been established.

## INTO THE FUTURE

As we look ahead to the completion of the stabilization phase and the transition to normalization, significant changes must be made to suppress renewed conflict and build a durable peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Specific recommendations include:

- Reinforcing the overall objectives in Bosnia and Herzegovina:
  - a. Reaffirmation of the objectives presented in the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP).
  - b. Establishment of a multiethnic, democratic government, even if as a confederation of Bosniacs, Croats, and Serbs.
  - c. Respect for fundamental human rights.
  - d. Respect for the sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the international community and noninterference in the internal affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina by its neighbors.
  - e. Adherence to existing arms control regimes and the development of further arms control agreements to maintain peace and security at lower levels of armaments.
  - f. Establishment of a viable economy in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
- Establishing NATO as the strategic civilian–military implementation staff for both military and civilian implementation of the Dayton Accords.
- Creating a civilian–military implementation staff in Sarajevo with overall authority over operational coordination with Bosnia and Herzegovina.
- Establishing internal security as a priority program with emphasis on the deployment of an international police force and the creation of an effective training program for Bosnian police.

- Reaffirming the commitment of key international actors—particularly the United Nations, NATO, and the United States—to remain engaged in Bosnian affairs until specified objectives are met.
- Reaffirming the extant rules of engagement.

## BEYOND BOSNIA

As the international community looks ahead to an ever-expanding role in conflict prevention and in suppression of renewed conflict, the four principles discussed above should be seriously considered, and structural and functional preparations made. In order to advance the prospects for successful conflict prevention, the following measures should be considered:

1. *UN Organizational Preparations.* The role of the United Nations in the prevention of deadly conflict will expand in the future—there are no alternatives to establishing the moral authority necessary to the success of conflict prevention. Accordingly, the United Nations should establish a standing civilian–military implementation staff, including command and control, that would facilitate the civilian–military interface in operations appropriate for direct UN involvement. Within the CMIS, the UN should establish a conflict prevention assessment unit to analyze developments throughout the world and prepare contingency plans for conflict prevention. While such contingency plans would not be exhaustive, they would provide the foundation upon which the UN could build rapidly as a situation began to sour.
2. *NATO Organizational Preparations.* Because of its geographical reach, its membership, and its standing organizational strengths, NATO is the organization of choice to accomplish UN-mandated conflict prevention operations throughout Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. Accordingly, NATO should establish a standing CMIS.
3. *Exercises.* At both the UN and NATO, a series of exercises should be developed and implemented to hone and focus the abilities of the CMIS at the strategic and operational levels.
4. *National and International Imprimaturs.* The effectiveness of the CMIS at any level is a function of the willingness of various international organizations, NGOs, and the private sector to surrender some autonomy to the CMIS. The UN and NATO should begin consulta-

tions with as many of these organizations as possible to explain the concept of the CMIS, the rationale for cooperation, and the requirements of the implementation staff.

5. *Rules of Engagement.* The rules of engagement in Bosnia and Herzegovina can be a model for such rules in other situations. While they may not be applicable everywhere, they can be tailored for other situations.

As the world grapples with the challenges of international security in the new century, peace operations and the prevention of deadly conflict move to center stage. A realistic, proactive approach to deadly conflict, buttressed by structures and procedures that facilitate conflict prevention operations, is of central importance to the evolution of the international system and to peace and security in the years ahead. The proposals outlined in this report are intended to help the international community begin to build these structures and procedures in a realistic, definitive fashion.

---

---

# CIVILIAN – MILITARY COOPERATION IN THE PREVENTION OF DEADLY CONFLICT

PREVENTING DEADLY CONFLICT requires a comprehensive, integrated effort that harnesses the capabilities of international institutions, individual governments, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector across the spectrum of military, economic, political, social, psychological, and informational issues. Success depends on developing new ways of managing conflict prevention activities, especially as regards command-and-control structures for translating mandates into practice.

We believe that a balanced, integrated civilian–military implementation staff and actions are essential to shape successful operations to prevent the re-emergence of violence. Indeed, although military forces can maintain an absence of war, they cannot by themselves build peace. Only societies and their governments, supported by nongovernmental agencies and organizations, can construct the framework for an enduring peace. This is especially apparent in cases where the military forces come from “outside”—that is, from third parties through established multilateral mechanisms such as the United Nations. The ultimate responsibility for security, well-being, and justice in any society rests within that society itself.

Accordingly, we present here a detailed methodology for joint action involving civilian and military organizations, and suggest specific measures—structural and operational—to effect the civilian-military integration that is crucial in conflict prevention and that can lead to the assumption of responsibilities by a legitimate local government. We outline the basic structural-functional imperatives, detail how these apply to urgent requirements for peacebuilding and transition in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and elaborate a framework for the general application of organizational principles of conflict prevention throughout the international community. At the center of our recommendations is the establishment of a civilian-military implementation staff (CMIS) with the responsibility and authority to coordinate the activities of all organizations involved in a conflict prevention operation.

## SUPPRESSING THE RE-EMERGENCE OF CONFLICT

Preventing violent conflict has three broad operational manifestations: operations to prevent the emergence of conflict; operations to contain a conflict already under way; and operations to prevent the re-emergence of conflict in the aftermath of a cease-fire or peace accord.<sup>1</sup>

The third case—preventing or suppressing the re-emergence of conflict—presents unique challenges and is particularly illustrative of the need for effective civilian-military implementation. Efforts under way in such places as Northern Ireland, Bosnia, Cambodia, and the Great Lakes region of Africa demonstrate the importance—and the difficulties—of this form of conflict prevention. In many situations, lasting peace has proved to be tragically elusive.

Efforts to prevent the re-emergence of conflict run into three problems unique in conflict prevention operations. First, in the wake of a conflict, many of the leaders who played key roles during hostilities remain active on the political scene. Indeed, they may have played major roles in achieving a cease-fire or a peace accord and, as a result, may have secured for themselves positions of substantial postconflict influence. Often, the lingering presence of one or more of these wartime leaders remains a source of constant irritation, and fuels suspicion as the various sides attempt to sort out the postwar order.

Second, protracted conflict—or even abbreviated conflict if it is highly destructive—often results in the collapse of prewar political and economic systems, causing major disruptions in public services, severe declines in standards of living, and great difficulties in maintaining law

and order. Postwar rebuilding efforts—of central importance to the suppression of conflict—must be undertaken across a broad range of activities and disciplines. It is not enough to stop the fighting; institutions, processes, and capabilities must be rebuilt to sustain the peace.

Third, prolonged violence exacts an enormous human toll. People lose family members, homes, and livelihoods and become deeply scarred by the conflict. Inevitably, many may seek revenge—personally and collectively. The potential for renewed violence and conflict lies dangerously close to the surface. Tensions must be defused, and grievances—real or imagined—must be addressed rapidly, before the factions have the chance to reignite the conflict.

Suppressing the potential for renewed violence is not a new problem. In the wake of the world wars, two approaches to conflict suppression were adopted. One was a strategy of repression, accompanied by retribution, such as was embodied in the Versailles Treaty—a treaty that is generally blamed for giving rise to Nazism and thus to World War II.<sup>2</sup> The same strategy was also evident in Soviet treatment of Germany after its defeat in 1945. Moscow's overarching objective was to establish a German rump state totally under the control of the Soviet Union. Accordingly, Moscow moved great quantities of capital equipment eastward, seized and dismantled German manufacturing capabilities, and deported large numbers of skilled workers. Furthermore, the Soviet Union remained an active opponent of European recovery, particularly within Germany.

The second approach was the polar opposite: reconstruction and rehabilitation. The most striking example of this approach was, of course, U.S. policy toward Germany and Japan after World War II. The United States, convinced that the reconstruction of both Europe and Japan was essential to long-term peace and stability, took it upon itself to help rehabilitate and rebuild both of these wartime enemies. The Marshall Plan—which pumped more than \$13 billion into the prostrate economies of war-torn states—helped establish the longest period of European peace in a millennium in Western Europe. Moreover, the United States established a significant military presence in both regions in order to buttress the peace—a military presence that remains even after a half-century.<sup>3</sup>

In today's world, littered as it is with so many conflicts, the need for outside organizations and institutions to help frame the postwar environment is no less acute. The lessons of this century remain valid: the degree to which the international community approaches the suppression of renewed conflict with enlightenment, imagination, and a long-term commitment will determine whether or not the peace is sustained.

The focus of conflict prevention operations must now move from

unplanned reaction to reasoned response. To make this transition, we require a methodology, an organization, and a genuine capability to act.

### WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

Attempts to prevent the re-emergence of violent conflict are generally made against the backdrop of a cease-fire or a peace accord. The terms of the agreed-upon peace will help shape the nature, composition, and scale of civilian and military preventive actions. Regardless of the particulars of the peace accord, however, re-emergent conflict can be best suppressed through the creation of capable states—states that have representative governments based on the rule of law, that provide widely available economic opportunity and social safety nets, that protect fundamental human rights, and that enjoy robust civil societies.<sup>4</sup> These elements can be fashioned only with patience, persistence, imagination, and resources. Perhaps the most fundamental challenge is to provide a framework for a transition to democratic institutions—a transition in which outside nations, organizations, and institutions must play a critical part. They must act in concert to create rapidly a safe and secure environment and to open up the political space and provide the time necessary for societies and their leaders to organize and sustain the institutions and processes necessary for a functioning state.


### POSTCONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION AND PREVENTING THE RE-EMERGENCE OF VIOLENCE

An operation to prevent the re-emergence of conflict should adopt a phased approach that disciplines the overall effort while providing opportunities for focused planning, simulations, and exercises (thus exposing weaknesses before operations actually begin). Phasing also underlines the need for specific political decisions to be made if the operation is to succeed.

The operation should anticipate passing through three phases: transformation, stabilization, and normalization (see Figure 1).

#### TRANSFORMATION

In the transformation phase the terms of the peace agreement are initially operationalized on the ground. The most urgent task during this phase is



**Figure 1. Postconflict reconstruction and preventing the re-emergence of violence: Phases and levels of effort of indigenous, civilian, and military operations.** Aggregate levels of activity will grow as governmental functions approach normalcy.

often the rapid introduction of security forces to enforce the military aspects of the peace accord. Several steps then follow quickly: restoring or establishing legitimate political authority; installing police, judicial, and penal systems; providing essential social services; and accelerating a return to productive economic activity. Therefore, the primary thrust in the beginning of this phase is for military or internal security forces to create a secure environment and ensure freedom of movement while longer-term civilian functions are set in motion. Typical civilian–military tasks in this phase include:

- Separate warring—or potentially warring—parties
- Maintain peace and security
- Enforce arms embargoes
- Disarm belligerents and assist in their demobilization

- Supervise compliance with arms control measures
- Restore basic services
- Provide humanitarian relief, including emergency assistance

The emphasis here is on strategic and nationwide action. The message must be clearly conveyed that the war is over—and the peace process is irreversible.

### STABILIZATION

As compliance with the military aspects of the peace accord becomes more routine and civilian recovery measures are set in motion, the central thrust shifts from military to civilian implementation, and from establishing nationwide strategies to achieving localized implementation. It is during the stabilization phase that the institutions of the indigenous government are gradually readied to assume their future roles. Typical tasks in this phase include:

- Maintain internal stability
- Establish the minimum level of military capacity essential for the country's self-defense
- Restart the economic base
- Establish an indigenous police capacity
- Re-establish the educational system
- Build political institutions
- Re-establish the public health system

### NORMALIZATION

During normalization, external forces and assistance are gradually withdrawn and their responsibilities are turned over to evolving institutions within the country itself. During this phase, the final transition from conflict to normalcy occurs, clearing the way for international assistance to be terminated. Tasks accomplished during this phase include:

- Gradually hand over internal security responsibilities to local police
- Ensure that the judicial system is functioning
- Withdraw international military forces while maintaining the capacity to keep the peace with forces outside the country

- Gradually transfer responsibility for services to the local government
- Assist in the expansion of the economic base
- Make the transition to self-governance

Each of the three phases calls for a different level of effort by different governments, agencies, and organizations involved in civilian-military implementation. In the transformation phase, with the focus heavily on peacekeeping operations, the military component assumes preeminent responsibility. As the transformation phase matures, the military situation stabilizes, and the peace takes root; however, civilian agencies and organizations should gradually become more active. This process extends into the stabilization phase, during which military activities continue to decrease and military forces diminish, while civilian implementation, now gathering momentum and organizational coherence, begins to assume the dominant role until the transition to normalization is accomplished.

In this final phase, the military component decreases dramatically, implementation by international civilian organizations continues, and local governments and institutions gradually reassume the full breadth and scope of their responsibilities. It is during this phase that the preponderance of international support activities—civilian and military—eventually disappears.

## LEVELS OF MANAGEMENT

Throughout each phase, the operation must be managed at three levels simultaneously: strategic, operational, and tactical.<sup>5</sup> At the strategic level, broad policy objectives are developed and promulgated; international coordination is effected at its most general level; resources are garnered; and the cooperation of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and the private sector is sought. Actions at the strategic level include oversight and coordination at the United Nations, within national governments, and at the headquarters of the engaged international organizations and NGOs.

Close cooperation at the strategic level between military and civilian leaders is essential. International and national decision makers must know the strengths and the limitations of each element of power at their disposal, including military forces. Diplomacy, supported by a strong military capability and domestic political consensus, can be a powerful tool in preventing deadly conflict. Every effort should be made early in a

Levels of Management		
STRATEGIC	OPERATIONAL	TACTICAL
UN/NATO/U.S. GOVERNMENT	IN-COUNTRY	ON THE GROUND
BROAD POLICY	SPECIFIC TASKS	DAY-TO-DAY TASKS
RESOURCES GARNERED	INTEGRATION	DIRECT ACTION
ASSESSMENT OF ACTORS	PROJECTIONS OF COUNTRY ISSUES	

**Figure 2.** Efforts to prevent the re-emergence of violence must be managed at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels simultaneously.

crisis to bring all elements of power together. In this regard, the challenge is to create an organizational structure capable of rapid response in support of general political objectives and to provide oversight of the work in the three phases (see Figure 2).

*At the operational level*, broad guidance to implementing agencies and organizations is translated into concrete efforts to integrate and coordinate their work on the ground. At this level, it is vital that procedures and structures be created that can ensure a coordinated effort across the entire range of operations. Management organizations must be both operationally effective and representative of the various nations and groups contributing to the conflict prevention operation.

*At the tactical level*, the “muddy boots” work—limited in both functional and geographic scope—is done. Coordination is necessarily often *ad hoc* and informal, but even here mechanisms and processes should be developed to ensure that efforts are thoroughly integrated, that intelligence is shared, and that operations and purposes are complementary. The need for this coordination becomes particularly apparent as the number of humanitarian agencies and NGOs increases and the overall complexity of the operation grows.

#### PRINCIPLES OF CIVILIAN-MILITARY IMPLEMENTATION

Over the past several years, the international community has gained a good deal of experience in trying to suppress deadly conflict. On the

basis of that experience we can formulate four principles to guide future civilian–military implementation. While civilian and military leaders may place differing emphasis on these principles, they provide a common vocabulary and approach to the challenges of conflict prevention:

1. *Clarity of mission and objectives.* In other words, specify clearly the mission of the intervention and clearly relate operational objectives to this mission.
2. *Unity of authority and integration of effort.* Establish a single chain of authority responsible for implementing the overall operation, and integrate the civilian–military effort and the efforts of outsiders and insiders.
3. *Timely political decisions and international commitment.* Coordinate bilateral and multilateral deliberations to ensure timely decision making and to help maintain international commitment.
4. *Robust and realistic rules of engagement.* Develop rules of engagement to permit the “best possible” implementation rather than the “minimum necessary.”

### CLARITY OF MISSION AND OBJECTIVES

The agencies, governments, and forces helping to implement a peace settlement must have a clear understanding of what is to be accomplished. The mission may be straightforward (for instance, to stop people from killing one another) or it may be complex (for example, the social, economic, and political restructuring of a war-torn society), but in all cases a crucial first step is to establish clarity of mission at the strategic level. Once established, it will indicate what kinds of civilian and military teams are required, what resources they will need, and how they can best be trained. It will also bring to the forefront issues of authority, responsibility, and rules of engagement, each of which must be resolved with equal clarity.

In operations to prevent the re-emergence of deadly conflict, missions and objectives are rooted in the terms of the peace accords that stop the fighting and form the foundation for national recovery and reconciliation. Therefore, the tone and content of the peace accord itself are important in clarifying the missions and objectives of implementing forces; indeed, it is within the peace accord itself that we find the policy guidelines that are to be implemented on the ground.

This is not to say that we should expect all peace treaties to contain detailed guidance on all, or even most, of the key issues. Although it is possible for a peace accord to be shaped by its signatories to facilitate its implementation, peace accords are more usually shaped by the need to achieve political consensus, and the terms of such accords are almost invariably subject to variable interpretations. Under such circumstances, those responsible for carrying out the terms of the accords must be fully aware of the various implementing roles and responsibilities envisioned by the drafters. One way to create this awareness is to invite the implementers to participate in the negotiations.

The importance of leadership is evident from the very beginning in shaping and interpreting missions and objectives. One nation or organization must step up and take the lead to help ensure coherence and maintain forward momentum. In those numerous cases in which the United Nations fills this leadership role, it is important that the Security Council achieve a consensus in a timely fashion, so as to provide the opportunity for adequate planning and coordination.

Missions and objectives must not only be clear, they must also be achievable. In practice, this means accepting solutions that are imperfect or incremental in nature. Thus, missions and objectives for both civilian and military leaders must be sufficiently flexible to allow for modifications as the operation proceeds. In this regard, leaders must build in periodic reviews or “rolling assessments” to permit adjustments to be made and new missions to be undertaken if necessary.

When a peace accord contains strategic statements of a mission and its objectives, those statements must be translated subsequently into specific missions and objectives for those forces, institutions, and organizations that will implement the accord. For example, the Dayton Accords contained provisions to reduce certain types of armaments by the belligerents. NATO, as the implementing organization, then established specific missions and objectives—such as the collection of weapons in designated points—to achieve the strategic aim. But other organizations—such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which took on tasks relating to the inspection of residual holdings—had a role to play as well.

Although it can prove extremely difficult to coordinate these subordinate objectives, the importance of such coordination is hard to over-emphasize. While it is neither practical nor necessary for each institution and organization to detail, in precise terms, how it will coordinate its activities with those of all other actors, it is essential that each one understands what the others are trying to achieve and how its own efforts contribute to the overall strategy.

Several examples serve to illustrate the fundamental importance of clarity in missions and objectives. In Somalia, UN objectives were unclear and changing. The United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) was established in 1992 solely to supervise a cease-fire and provide security for the delivery of humanitarian relief.<sup>6</sup> Less than a year later, when it became apparent that the political turmoil in Somalia was preventing the United Nations from achieving its limited objectives, UNOSOM II was created and given greatly expanded objectives.<sup>7</sup> Tens of thousands of soldiers were charged with the manifold tasks of establishing a secure environment throughout Somalia, helping the Somali people rebuild their social and political life, and beginning a process of national reconciliation based on democratic governance. Then, in response to the murder of 25 UNOSOM soldiers on 6 June 1993, the Security Council added yet another dimension to the mission—hunting down the perpetrators. Faced with so bewildering an array of objectives, the various international actors involved in Somalia found it hard to understand one another's aims, and even harder to coordinate their actions. In the end, the United Nations and the United States left Somalia to its own devices, having helped to overcome the immediate humanitarian crisis but falling far short of the Security Council's objective of fostering political reconciliation.

In 1994 the United States was given the task under the provisions of Chapter VI of the UN Charter of providing humanitarian assistance to Rwandan refugees who were dying in large numbers. With the memory of Somalia still fresh in their minds, U.S. military leaders in the U.S. European Command went to great lengths to ensure that, in this operation, objectives and goals were clear and that both the scope and the limitations of the mission were specified. Equipped with this understanding, they were able to develop the force packages, deploy the capabilities necessary to accomplish the mission, determine when UN objectives had been achieved, and then withdraw.

At the operational level, the U.S. military command in Rwanda was careful not to move beyond its explicit mission. When the command was approached with a request to expand its mission and enter the refugee camps to arrest the Hutu militia leaders and members of the former Rwandan government and army, the senior military commander immediately sought political guidance from Washington. Of immediate concern to the commander was that he had organized for mission A—humanitarian assistance—not mission B—eliminating the rebels from the camps. U.S. troops were not properly equipped nor trained for mission B. There was no air support or artillery to support a combat mission. In other words, the United States would be putting its troops at unacceptable risk to eliminate rebel forces from the refugee camps. That is

why the commander asked military and political authorities in Washington for clarity in his mission and for guidance. No such guidance was issued, and the new mission was not undertaken.

Objectives must not only be formulated and understood, they must also be articulated throughout domestic and international constituencies. Since the wrenching American experience in Vietnam, it has been a matter of U.S. policy that the commitment of U.S. resources abroad must be rooted in a firm articulation and broad public acceptance of policy objectives.<sup>8</sup> The same must hold true for other actors—international organizations, NGOs, nations, and private enterprises. For it is these objectives that form the foundation for policies, actions, and decisions in the prevention of conflict. Absent such objectives, collective and individual efforts will almost certainly fail, possibly leaving conditions worse than they were before the preventive efforts began.

The objectives must be more than a lofty statement of ideals. They must include specific tasks to be assigned to the organizations and institutions that will undertake the preventive work. Individuals and organizations must know what tasks are expected of them, the conditions under which these tasks are to be performed, and standards (for example, milestones and timelines) by which progress can be measured and eventual success or failure determined. A list of tasks must be prepared that covers the entire spectrum of relevant activities—military, political, social, economic, psychological, and informational. These tasks should be thoroughly examined to discern where they overlap, complement, or conflict with one another.

The task list also helps crystallize the number of organizations required for the accomplishment of any given task. Diplomats, political leaders, NGO officials, and military commanders must all take part in determining what is required to accomplish the assigned missions. Once tasks and subtasks have been identified, it becomes far easier to judge if the participation of other organizations is necessary or desirable.

#### **UNITY OF AUTHORITY AND INTEGRATION OF EFFORT— THE ROLE OF THE CMIS**

There is neither a more important principle, nor one more difficult to abide by, than establishing and maintaining unity of authority in the planning and execution of civilian-military operations to prevent the re-emergence of deadly conflict. The question "Who's in charge?" must be answered clearly and precisely.

The creation of an overarching organization—a civilian-military

implementation staff—at both the strategic and the operational level is the key to the effective use of diverse organizations and resources, as well as to the successful conduct of the day-to-day management of conflict prevention at all levels. A CMIS may be needed at each of the management levels: strategic, operational, and tactical, depending upon the nature of the conflict prevention operation. At each level, the CMIS is an implementing and integrating body—designed to breathe life into the terms of a peace accord or other international agreement. It establishes policies for and coordinates the management of implementation. (Below, we propose a model for such an organization.)

In the beginning of any conflict prevention operation, a clear mandate of authority must be promulgated by an organization with the standing and clout to make such a mandate legitimate. The United Nations is one obvious source of such a mandate, but for certain operations an appropriate regional organization, such as NATO, can also provide the necessary authority. Whatever its origin, the mandate must identify the basis for the action, the locus of authority, and the objectives that the operation is designed to achieve. If endowed with such authority by the United Nations or other appropriate organization, the CMIS can then develop its structure, membership, operational procedures, and management system.

The establishment of the mandate, however, is fraught with difficulties—posed not only by the states and international organizations involved but also by other members of the peacebuilding community. Many of the organizations that participate in conflict prevention operations—particularly NGOs and elements of the private sector—have no obligation to respond to any national or international authority, including the United Nations. NGOs, in competition for scarce resources, often eschew the sharing of information and are reluctant to cooperate.

Moreover, many civilian agencies strongly resist any requirement that they subordinate themselves to—or even cooperate with—a military chain of command. At the same time, military leaders are often equally reluctant to place themselves under the direction of a civilian organization, particularly one that has an international membership, and chafe under what they consider to be ill-informed and ill-advised civilian guidance.

Further complicating the problem is the fact that different organizations have radically different organizational skills and structures. The military, with its well-defined hierarchical structure, is normally able to respond on relatively short notice to fulfill a wide variety of missions. In the Rwanda operation, for example, the U.S. European Command deployed site survey teams and advance parties within 48 hours of the

formal order to proceed, despite the fact that humanitarian relief operations were not high on the list of missions for which it had prepared itself.

Yet we would do well to recognize the limitations on what the military can or should be expected to achieve. Most tasks associated with reconciliation and reconstruction during the stabilization and normalization phases do not lend themselves to military solutions; these are tasks of economic development, political evolution, and social justice.

Civilian organizations, by contrast, are often more loosely organized than the military and generally lack sufficient resources to respond as quickly to complex and often dangerous situations. And there are few civilian organizations that can coordinate multiorganizational operations. Moreover, the task of coordinating civilian organizations is far more complex than that of orchestrating military involvement because the range of potential civilian participants in conflict prevention is so much broader. Yet, these same organizations must assume greater roles as the operation moves into the stabilization and normalization phases.

Thus, the military sometimes becomes the court of first resort in dealing with an incipient conflict or with a crisis, even in those situations where civilian organizations should take the lead. It simply takes too long to put together an *ad hoc* civilian structure to deal with the immediacy of the conflict prevention requirement.

All the differences make it difficult to forge effective teams to manage a conflict prevention operation, particularly one launched in response to an immediate crisis. Yet, such a team approach is fundamental to success. How do we overcome this dilemma? How do we fuse together, or at least bring into harmony, the military and civilian components within a structure that allows the strengths of both to be exploited to their full potential? The answer, we believe, lies in establishing a civilian-military implementation staff organized with structure and imagination to accomplish its coordinating and integrating functions.


Leadership positions in the CMIS should not be assigned automatically, nor should leaders necessarily be appointed according to which organization is providing the most resources. Instead, the leadership role may shift over time, as preventive actions pass from one phase to another, with leaders appointed on the basis of the principal thrust of activities during each phase.

In addition to coordinating the activities of donor governments and NGOs, the CMIS must attract private sector cooperation by demonstrating that the private sector will reap economic benefits by supporting a comprehensive approach to the suppression of violent conflict. Indeed, the importance of the private sector will grow in the future as

nations increasingly privatize functions previously undertaken exclusively by the state.

Private sector organizations already participate in many relief operations. What is new, however, is the almost continuous demand for large quantities of humanitarian aid delivered through increasingly complex operations. Private sector operations present the international community with new and daunting challenges of oversight, control, and integration. It is important, therefore, that relevant private sector organizations and corporations are brought onto the team as part of the CMIS.

This model has been tried with varying degrees of success. CMISs have been primarily *ad hoc* and voluntary in nature. In Rwanda, a plethora of international organizations and NGOs came together under the aegis of the U.S. military and formed the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC). The CMOC coordinated the range of activities that focused on providing relief to the refugees in the camps. Initially manned solely by the military, the CMOC staff expanded to include civilian representatives as well (see Figure 3). The primary coordinating tool of the CMOC was the daily meeting of the principal representatives of each of the major organizations—military and civilian. The rapid success in



**Figure 3.** An example of a civilian-military implementation staff: the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) for Rwanda, which provided relief to refugee camps. It coordinated the efforts of the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda, the United Nations Children's Fund, the UN Development Programme, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the UN Rwanda Emergency Office, the World Food Programme, and the U.S. Agency for International Development.

meeting the mandated objectives in 1994 was due in no small measure to the operation of the CMOC.

But participation in the CMOC was voluntary, and its actions were in no way binding on the participants. The CMOC served principally as an agency for coordination and information. Through the CMOC, each participant became aware of the objectives and activities of the other participants. But the CMOC had no authority to direct actions by any organization. It was successful largely because the basic objectives of each of the participants were compatible and relatively straightforward—namely, to “stop the dying.” Had the objectives been more complex—had they included requirements to clear the camps, arrest the Hutu insurgents, or broker a political accommodation—the CMOC would have found itself embroiled in considerable disagreement and controversy. Under those circumstances, it is doubtful that the CMOC—with its nonexistent authority—would have been adequate to the task of orchestrating broader conflict prevention operations.

Similarly, in Somalia, the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) provided a mechanism for integrating civilian–military implementation. UNITAF embraced a wide range of military and civilian organizations and, through its daily meetings, was effective in coordinating the disparate activities of the plethora of agencies and nationalities involved in Somalia. However, UNITAF’s ability to coordinate depended on the willingness of its constituent organizations to offer information and to make compromises. Moreover, UNITAF was relatively short-lived. It was replaced by UNOSOM II, which was generally ineffective in coordinating civilian and military implementation operations.

This track record notwithstanding, the establishment of an effective CMIS remains critical to the success of a conflict suppression operation. A CMIS also would provide an instrument for the agile changes in direction and focus necessary to adapt to unforeseen developments.

Ideally, a CMIS would integrate all activities; in practice, however, this is difficult to achieve, and thus a CMIS should focus on integrating functions related to a series of specific events. These events, which should themselves be integrated into a unitary vision of the overall shape of the operation, might include elections; the return of refugees, major economic initiatives, the repair of key infrastructure assets, visits by major figures in the international community, and the withdrawal of peacekeepers.

The development of time-phased, detailed matrices of actions and responsibilities focused on each major event will help ensure that coordination extends across activities and that no major functions are left unaddressed. Moreover, this approach allows representatives to anticipate shortfalls in resources and alert their organizations.

### **TIMELY POLITICAL DECISIONS AND INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENT**

Early warning is a crucial element in successful conflict prevention operations, but more important may be the capabilities and strategies to respond to such warning,<sup>9</sup> especially in operations to suppress the re-emergence of conflict. Such operations demand that political decision makers be highly responsive and agile. The fact that peacekeepers and peace builders must be able to react quickly to the ebb and flow of a post-war environment puts a premium on systems that streamline the process of political decision making. Any system that induces or permits excessive delays in reaching political decisions will condemn itself to irrelevance, no matter how clear the mission objectives may be, how unified and effective the CMIS may be, or how committed the actors may be. Measures to streamline political decision making will be controversial because they imply a degree of “preapproval” of some operations and a broad decentralization of decision-making authority in other operations.

In successful conflict preventive operations every organization and institution involved must understand the requirement that they all stay the course. The willingness of donor nations in particular to maintain their support is of fundamental importance throughout. An integrated approach to conflict prevention produces a mosaic of actions and activities, each of which ideally supports a range of other activities. When one tile in the mosaic disappears, the entire pattern is in danger of losing its coherence.

As a corollary to this principle, the establishment of arbitrary timelines for the withdrawal of peacekeeping forces or other international organizations is nearly always counterproductive. Commitments must be made to satisfy objectives, not to meet predetermined timelines.

### **ROBUST AND REALISTIC RULES OF ENGAGEMENT**

Rules of engagement are the predetermined conditions under which peacekeepers and international police are permitted to use forceful measures. Robust, realistic rules of engagement provide local military commanders and civilian leaders with much greater flexibility and much greater credibility in enforcing the terms of a peace agreement, particularly during the transformation phase.

The establishment of rules of engagement is nearly always laden with debate and passion, for they involve the use of deadly force and violence in an environment in which the objective is peace. How do they work in practice? Under specified conditions, rules of engagement turn

over to military commanders and police officials the authority to employ the ultimate measure of authority and loose the bonds of civilian control. Rules of engagement are developed very carefully and tend to be far more restrictive than the conditions may warrant. Model rules of engagement have been developed for a broad range of conditions and are usually well understood by professional militaries.

These four principles of civilian-military implementation are not, of course, by themselves an answer to all the problems associated with preventing deadly conflict. They do, however, form the basis for developing and implementing conflict prevention operations and their supporting civilian-military structures.

#### **CIVILIAN-MILITARY IMPLEMENTATION: THE CASE OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA**

Few situations in the post-Cold War environment are more illustrative of the demands for effective and integrated civilian and military implementation than that of postwar Bosnia and Herzegovina. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, we can see not only the value of the concepts outlined above but also the practical policy implications as the international community moves toward the next phase of its involvement. While not a specific template for every conflict prevention operation, the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina underscores the need for effective civilian-military integration at all levels.

#### **ENFORCEMENT AND IFOR**

In the summer of 1995, Bosnia and Herzegovina was on the verge of total collapse: "ethnic cleansing" and public atrocities were rampant; the capital, Sarajevo, lay under siege; the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was ineffective at controlling the violence; and NATO as an institution was viewed as increasingly irrelevant to the challenges posed by post-Cold War intrastate conflict. The United States was opposed to sending American forces into Bosnia, and was arguing that its NATO allies should do more. Relations with Russia were strained over Bosnia. More than six years after the revolutions of 1989, the future of stability in Europe looked far from certain.

In the early summer of 1995, the downward spiral reached its

nadir. The failure of the international community to respond to the challenges of instability and annihilation in the Balkans led to the twin tragedies of Srebrenica and Zepa. The massacres perpetrated by the Serbs in these two cities set in motion a series of decisions that would eventually lead to the final cease-fire and to the Dayton Accords. The international community met in London to discuss possible responses to attacks on other UN protected safe areas, among them Sarajevo, Gorazde, Tuzla, and Bihać. Attention quickly turned to NATO and its ability to take assertive steps to stop the Serb attacks. To prevent continuing attacks on these safe areas, NATO was given predesignated authority to attack Serb forces in a broad zone of action. The North Atlantic Council, with the unanimous support of all 16 member nations of NATO, provided NATO military leaders with a clear mission. That formal mission was supplemented by decisions taken by the North Atlantic Council that clarified objectives and military tasks. Among other things, these decisions specified:

- *Triggers*—sets of circumstances (manifest threats or actions, including shelling of safe areas) that would permit NATO forces to respond immediately with air strikes
- *The zone of action*—the area in which NATO forces were authorized to act. Because of the Serb tactic of massing from many different locations, NATO forces needed the ability to reach out and strike more than just the specific howitzer or mortar that had fired the shell that had prompted the NATO action. The zone of action had to be wide enough to include associated targets such as ammunition sites, logistical points, and command-and-control centers. In the end, the North Atlantic Council approved two major zones of action: eastern Bosnia and western Bosnia.

Because of the nature of the alliance, NATO had clear lines of authority and unity of effort. There was no ambiguity regarding the authority and responsibilities of the senior political and military leaders in the alliance. And this made the inherently difficult task of coordinating the efforts of many nations in a complex military operation easier. At the strategic level the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), had overall responsibility; at the operational level, responsibility was vested in NATO's Southern Command; and at the tactical level, NATO's air component commander was in charge. Politically, SACEUR, as the overall military authority, reported directly to the secretary general of NATO and to the North Atlantic Council.

There was a clear commitment on the part of NATO to carry out these operations in response to specific acts by the Bosnian Serbs. Moreover, because of the established decision-making structure of the North Atlantic Council and because of the preoperational planning and approvals, NATO was able to arrive at timely decisions when one of the triggers was activated.

Finally, there were clear rules of engagement to provide practical guidelines that, in turn, determined the scope and breadth of NATO strikes. The North Atlantic Council provided unambiguous guidance on target criteria: it defined hostile intent and hostile acts, it eliminated the “dual key” provision that had required political approval of target engagement by both NATO and the United Nations, and it vested authority to terminate reprisal operations in the commander on the ground. NATO’s Military Committee was the focal point for the review and approval of the rules of engagement.

NATO was able to wield its combat power quickly and effectively when the Serbs shelled the marketplace in Sarajevo in late August 1995.<sup>10</sup> Air operations against Serb positions throughout eastern Bosnia began less than 24 hours after the Serb attack. Ultimately, these air strikes not only brought about a halt in the indiscriminate shelling of Bosnian urban targets by the Serbs but also were instrumental in bringing all the parties to the negotiating table at Dayton. Moreover, the air strikes proved crucial in buttressing the credibility of NATO. In the aftermath of these strikes, the Serbs withdrew more than 250 heavy weapons from the hills around the city, effectively bringing an end to the terror that the people of Sarajevo had endured for nearly four years.

In this case, the application of our four principles yielded conspicuous success. Unfortunately, however, the principles have been applied unevenly in post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina. As a result, significant structural and functional weaknesses exist today that must be addressed if the international community is to fulfill its commitments to bring peace and stability to the Balkans. In so doing, the United Nations and the international community can develop structures and procedures that will truly prevent deadly conflict, not only in Bosnia but also elsewhere. The Dayton Accords and the subsequent London Peace Implementation Conference laid out the following general goals and objectives to end the fighting in Bosnia:<sup>11</sup>

- The creation of a climate of stability and security in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the achievement of a durable and lasting political settlement
- The establishment of new political and constitutional arrangements for Bosnia and Herzegovina that will bring the country together within a framework of democracy and the rule of law

- The protection and promotion of human rights and the early return of refugees and displaced persons
- The establishment of an open, free-market economy
- A kick start to economic reconstruction
- The normalization of relations between Bosnia and Herzegovina and its neighbors, the region, and the rest of the international community

The first of these objectives was principally military in nature, whereas the rest required an intensive effort on the part of civilian agencies and organizations. At the same time, the achievement of each objective depended upon progress being made on the others: the resumption of the conflict could be suppressed only if processes and institutions were created to undergird an enduring peace, and such institutions and processes could develop only in the absence of conflict.

These overarching objectives—and their mutual interdependence—demanded a CMIS that would effect the necessary cooperation and synergy at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

Yet the Dayton Accords identified not one but two organizations and charged them with overseeing the various aspects of implementation: NATO was entrusted with implementing the military aspects of the accords and the United Nations was requested to appoint a High Representative to implement the civilian aspects.

The Dayton Accords provided a concise definition of NATO's mission and objectives: NATO was to "assist in implementation of the territorial and other militarily related provisions of the agreement."<sup>12</sup> NATO was further charged with the following tasks:

- Monitor and help ensure compliance by all parties with the military aspects of the agreement (including, in particular,

#### United Nations Tasking to the North Atlantic Council

"[The UN Security Council] authorizes the Member States acting through or in cooperation with the organization referred to in Annex 1-A of the Peace Agreement (The North Atlantic Council) to establish a multinational implementation force (IFOR) under unified command and control in order to fulfil the role specified in Annex 1-A and Annex 2 of the Peace Agreement."

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1031,  
paragraph 14, 15 December 1995  
(<http://www.un.org/Docs/sc.htm>).

withdrawal and redeployment of forces within agreed periods, and the establishment of Zones of Separation).

- Authorize and supervise the selective marking of the Agreed Cease-Fire Line and its Zone of Separation and the Inter-Entity Boundary Line and its Zone of Separation as established by the General Framework Agreement.
- Establish liaison arrangements with local civilian and military authorities and other international organizations as necessary for the accomplishment of its mission.
- Assist in the withdrawal of UN Peace Forces not transferred to the IFOR, including, if necessary, the emergency withdrawal of UNPRO Forces.
- Fulfill its supporting tasks, within the limits of its assigned principal tasks and available resources, on request, which include the following:
  - To help create secure conditions for the conduct by others of other tasks associated with the peace settlement, including free and fair elections
  - To assist the movement of organizations in the accomplishment of humanitarian missions
  - To assist the UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) and other international organizations in their humanitarian missions
  - To observe and prevent interference with the movement of civilian populations, refugees, and displaced persons, and to respond appropriately to deliberate violence to life and person
  - To monitor the clearing of minefields

The clarity with which the military tasks were specified was not an accident. Senior NATO military leaders, anticipating NATO's role in Bosnia, stayed in constant communication with the Dayton negotiators to ensure that what was agreed to at Dayton would be executable on the ground in Bosnia. Equipped with the structure and guidance of the Dayton Accords, and with the imprimatur of the North Atlantic Council, military commanders were able to quickly develop an operations plan that included strategic military guidance for deployed NATO forces. The operational plan (OPLAN 10405) covered the entire range of tasks to be accomplished by IFOR and each subordinate command in NATO's Allied Command Europe. The extent of this initial guidance and planning enabled IFOR to operate effectively for the next year with the participation of 36 nations, including Russia.

The accords offered a much less precise definition of the civilian aspects of the mission. The High Representative's mission was to "facilitate the Parties' own efforts and to mobilize and, as appropriate, coordinate the activities of the organizations and agencies involved in the civilian aspects of the peace settlement by carrying out . . . the [civilian] tasks."<sup>13</sup> The High Representative's tasks were defined vaguely:

- Monitor the implementation of the peace settlement.
- Maintain close contact with the parties to promote their full compliance with all civilian aspects of the peace settlement and a high level of cooperation between them and the organizations and agencies participating in those aspects.
- Coordinate the activities of the civilian organizations and agencies in Bosnia and Herzegovina to ensure the efficient implementation of the civilian aspects of the peace settlement. The High Representative shall respect their autonomy within their spheres of operation while as necessary giving general guidance to them about the impact of their activities on the implementation of the peace settlement.
- Facilitate the resolution of any difficulties arising in connection with civilian implementation.
- Participate in meetings of donor organizations, particularly on issues of rehabilitation and reconstruction.
- Report periodically on progress in implementation of the peace agreement concerning the tasks set forth in this agreement to the United Nations, the European Union, the United States, the Russian Federation, and other interested governments, parties, and organizations.

#### Establishment of the High Representative by the UN

"[The UN Security Council] endorses the establishment of a High Representative, following the request of the parties, who, in accordance with Annex 10 on the civilian implementation of the Peace Agreement, will monitor the implementation of the Peace Agreement and mobilize and, as appropriate, give guidance to, and coordinate the activities of, the civilian organizations and agencies involved."

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1031,  
paragraph 26, 15 December 1995  
(<http://www.un.org/Docs/sc.htm>).

- Provide guidance to, and receive reports from, the commissioner of the International Police Task Force established in Annex II to the General Framework Agreement.

The London Peace Implementation Conference, which immediately followed the Dayton Accords, confirmed specific objectives for the military aspects of implementation but provided no further details for the implementation of the civilian aspects. The conference merely reiterated the general guidance contained in the General Framework Agreement for Peace, and then discussed some near-term objectives for the High Representative, such as coordinating the establishment of basic services in Sarajevo. Given no clear tasks, objectives, or milestones, civilian organizations were left to operate at their own speed and had no way of measuring their success.

The implementation of the provisions of the peace agreement was to follow two chains—a military chain that ran through NATO, and a civilian chain under the direction of the High Representative.<sup>14</sup> There was no requirement for any kind of formal coordination, and no organization existed to integrate the two chains at any level—strategic, operational, or tactical (see Figure 4).


While the authority of NATO commanders to discharge their mission was in no doubt, the status of leadership on the civilian side was by no means clear. The High Representative's authority did not extend over the agencies and organizations involved in implementing the civilian aspects of the accords. The first High Representative, Carl Bildt, fought an uphill battle to establish himself and his office. Having given the office the requirement to mobilize and coordinate, the Dayton Accords then reminded the High Representative to “respect the autonomy of civil agencies.” No authority was given to demand the integration

#### The Role of the High Representative

“The High Representative or his designated representative shall remain in close contact with the IFOR Commander or his designated representatives and establish appropriate liaison arrangements with the IFOR Commander to facilitate the discharge of their respective responsibilities.

“The High Representative shall have no authority over the IFOR and shall not in any way interfere in the conduct of military operations or the IFOR chain of command.”

*General Framework Agreement for Peace, Annex IA.*  
Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs.



**Figure 4.** The two chains of command for implementation of the Dayton Accords under the aegis of the UN Security Council. The Peace Implementation Council (PIC) attempted to coordinate operations.

of the activities of the host of civilian agencies that would become involved in various aspects of Bosnian peace and stability.

To further complicate matters, a private corporation was hired to oversee the Train and Equip program for the Bosniac-Croat Federation. The Train and Equip program was instrumental in persuading the Bosniacs and the Croats to agree to the Dayton Accords. Although the stated objective of the program was to fulfill the mandate of the accords requiring a “balance” between the armed forces of the Bosniac-Croat Federation and the Republika Srpska, the Train and Equip effort remained outside of the formal coordination activities of the other organizations associated with Dayton implementation.<sup>15</sup>

More significantly, neither the Dayton Accords nor the UN mandate established a CMIS. The military and civilian management structures were encouraged to cooperate with each other, but they were not required to do so. The coordination and integration that did take place was by dint of personality, not structure.<sup>16</sup>

Furthermore, the High Representative had little formal authority over other UN agencies, such as the International Monetary Fund, UNHCR, and the World Bank, and none over the OSCE and the NGOs. So neither the High Representative nor IFOR—nor the Principal’s Group, in which the IFOR commander and the High Representa-

tive met regularly to address coordination issues, and which was later expanded to include the OSCE, UNHCR, and others—could command the degree of coordination and interaction necessitated by the complex requirements of the Dayton Accords and by the situation on the ground.

To be sure, efforts were made to coordinate at the strategic level with the establishment of the Peace Implementation Council and its steering committee. This council, chaired by the High Representative, met periodically throughout the post-Dayton period and brought together the principal organizations involved in the civilian and the military aspects of implementation. But it had no real authority to demand that the participants integrate their efforts, or even cooperate. Other organizations, such as the Principal's Group, were also *ad hoc* in nature and, although important in encouraging the flow of information, were not able to wield the institutional clout necessary to bring about genuine unity of effort.<sup>17</sup>

For IFOR, the absence of an effective civilian integration structure presented little difficulty in the beginning of the phase. Indeed, most of the tasks associated with these first few months were principally military in nature: separate the warring factions, disarm and secure heavy weapons, police the zones of separation, provide a security environment, and demonstrate overwhelming force to ensure compliance with the Dayton Accords.

As the operation moved into its sixth month, however, NATO began to look for ways to extricate IFOR from Bosnia and Herzegovina before its one-year mandate expired. But, in the absence of an effective plan or structure for implementing the civilian aspects of the operation, it became apparent that the conditions for IFOR withdrawal could not be met.<sup>18</sup> To be sure, the elections held in September 1996 were a significant success, but there was no good reason to believe that future events would proceed so smoothly. The enforcement phase of the Bosnia and

#### Civilian—Military Coordination under IFOR

"IFOR will achieve a civil-military unity of effort where IFOR forces focus on the military tasks and support the establishment and functioning of a High Representative civil structure. The civil structure should assume primary responsibility for coordination of the civil aspects of the peace agreement."

SACEUR OPLAN 10405, *Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR*,  
Annex H. December 1995.

### Civilian Operations: The Human Rights Coordination Centre

"The impact of the Human Rights Coordination Centre is largely dependent upon the support it receives from implementing organisations who, in turn, work with the HRCC in proportion to its usefulness to them in fulfilling their own mandates [with] overlapping roles and competing interests."

Source: *Implementation of the Human Rights Provisions of the Peace Agreement Mid-term Review Conference*. Florence, Italy, 13 June 1996 (<http://www.ohr.int/pic.htm>).

Herzegovina operation was ending in success, but the road ahead was complex and unpredictable.

Because of its leadership role in the international system as a whole and within NATO in particular, the United States became the bellwether for the commitment of the entire international community. From the beginning of the operation, the United States made it clear that its commitment was neither open-ended nor permanent, and the rest of the players in Bosnia and Herzegovina took their lead from the U.S. position.

The pronouncements and plans articulated by the United States during IFOR's term of service were shaped by the U.S. presidential elections and by mounting public concern about the U.S. role in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Domestic opposition to U.S. involvement would surely have been much greater had U.S. forces sustained any casualties due to hostile action in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Even in the absence of casualties, it was clear that the U.S. commitment was tenuous, and the international community and America's European allies watched very carefully for signs that U.S. resolve was eroding.

### STABILIZATION AND SFOR

In December 1996, NATO confronted the reality that the conditions that would allow for military forces to be withdrawn had yet to be created, and that there was little prospect of them being created in the foreseeable future. As the international community began to sort out the post-IFOR world, military commanders framed their plans according to the same criteria that had undergirded IFOR: clarity of mission, unity of command, political commitment and timely decisions, and effective rules of engagement.

Detailed discussions on the mission and tasks for the follow-on force were essential in order to determine how large the force should be

and, more importantly, to train the force for new tasks. During these discussions, military commanders went to great lengths to have the political leadership in the North Atlantic Council specify not only what SFOR was to do but also what it was not to do. Notably, the North Atlantic Council decided that SFOR would not hunt down and arrest indicted war criminals, would not perform civil police functions, and would not intervene directly in the forcible return of refugees.<sup>19</sup>

On the civilian side, the Office of the High Representative (OHR) had not yet created a detailed civilian implementation plan. Thus, the tasks for OHR and the civilian agencies and organizations remained largely *ad hoc* and were focused on a few specific events, and there were no overarching criteria by which to judge success. It was not until the meeting of the NATO foreign ministers at Sintra, Portugal, in May 1997 that clear milestones were established for the implementation of the civilian aspects of the Dayton Accords.<sup>20</sup> In future operations in Bosnia and elsewhere, it is vital that civilian tasks be addressed with the same discipline, sense of direction, and timeliness as are the military tasks.

As IFOR became SFOR, the military structure was tailored carefully to meet the requirements of the modified mission and tasks. The challenge was to structure a headquarters that would reflect the military force contributions of the nations to SFOR while ensuring adherence to the principle of unity of command. IFOR headquarters—principally an American operation—was to be replaced by SFOR headquarters—primarily a NATO regional command (Land Forces Central Europe, LANDCENT). The structure of SFOR included officers and staff from 25 nations and was able to rapidly assume new missions from the North Atlantic Council. It soon became apparent, however, that there was only scant evidence that the Bosniac-Croat Federation and the Republika Srpska were prepared to work together to assume governmental and security functions.<sup>21</sup>

Perhaps the overarching lesson to be gleaned from the first two years of conflict prevention operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina is that the military, no matter how effective and how efficient it might be, cannot by itself create the conditions for lasting peace. To be sure, in the first months of implementation of the Dayton Accords, the presence of overwhelming military force was instrumental in keeping the peace. But the daunting challenges of building the kinds of institutions and processes that underlie the Dayton agreement and, indeed, that are at the heart of conflict prevention are far beyond the abilities of any military. The military can bring about an absence of war; the military cannot bring about an enduring peace.

The interaction between the military structure and the civilian

structure thus becomes critical to the success of conflict prevention, whether in Bosnia or elsewhere. The rigorous application of the four principles described above will facilitate progress through the next phases of the peace operation and toward peace.

### **NORMALIZATION: NEXT STEPS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA**

As our discussion suggests, there is little cause for optimism that conditions in Bosnia will permit an early withdrawal of the international community or even of the military peacekeepers. To be sure, progress has been made, primarily as a result of the milestones laid down at the Sintra conference and the infusion of a new sense of purpose in the OHR. But 18 months were lost as the implementation of the civilian aspects of the Dayton Accords languished in a mire of confusion.<sup>22</sup>

The tasks that were to be completed under the Dayton Accords and the SFOR mandate are far from complete, and it is difficult to envision a specific date on which to make a transition from stabilization to normalization. As a result, no time frame can yet be conceived for the withdrawal of military forces and the full resumption of governance responsibilities by the Bosnian government. Thus, the continued presence of significant military forces seems likely and remains the basis for achieving the general objectives laid out in the Dayton Accords.

But SFOR—without a more imaginative approach to civilian–military interaction—will be no more successful in achieving international objectives by itself in Bosnia than was IFOR. Essential to the establishment of an enduring peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina will be the creation of CMISs at the strategic and operational levels to function in ways consistent with the four principles outlined above. A review of each of the principles as they apply to the future of Bosnia suggests how the international community should seek to move the operation into the normalization phase and establish the conditions for an enduring peace.

### **CLARITY OF MISSION AND OBJECTIVES**

Since the signing of the Dayton Accords, there has been an evolution of objectives and supporting missions among the governments, institutions, and organizations involved. The very purpose of establishing a multiethnic, integrated Bosnia and Herzegovina has come under fire from a vari-

ety of directions. A great deal of attention has been focused on the two Bosnian entities—Republika Srpska and the Bosniac-Croat Federation—but very little has been accomplished at the national level. This is especially evident within the ministries of defense of the two entities and their respective armies.

With forces committed beyond June 1998, it is essential that the international community reaffirm its fundamental objectives in Bosnia and the supporting missions. The United States and NATO need to provide leadership and direction within the international community and at the United Nations to articulate objectives that should contain the following elements:

- Reaffirmation of the Dayton objectives
- The establishment of a multiethnic, democratic government of Bosniacs, Croats, and Serbs
- Respect for fundamental human rights, including the return of refugees and the apprehension of indicted war criminals
- Respect for the sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the international community, and noninterference in the internal affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina by its neighbors
- Adherence to existing arms control regimes and the development of further arms control agreements to maintain peace and security at lower levels of armaments
- The creation of a viable economy in Bosnia and Herzegovina

While these objectives are general in nature, they form the foundation for specific operational components. Moreover, they help to reorient the supporting objectives of the various nations and organizations that will carry out tasks on the ground.

To achieve these objectives, the UN Security Council should ask NATO to continue to take the lead in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to assume responsibility for realizing these specific goals. The translation of general objectives and goals by the North Atlantic Council into specific tasks is essential to the success of the mission. Table 1 is an example of such a list of tasks. Although it is not all-encompassing, it reflects the degree of specificity that should be developed. Such a task list must provide useful, achievable criteria that can be used not only to determine the overall status of conflict prevention operations but also to project when transitions from one phase to another will occur and when the international effort will finally be completed. As is clear from this list, cooperation and coordination within and among the different agencies—military and civilian—are essential to success. Such coordination can best be advanced by a CMIS.

An illustration may prove helpful. Among the most pressing needs confronting Bosnia and Herzegovina is the absence of an effective police force. A substantial gap in capabilities currently exists between the heavily armed SFOR and the unarmed International Police Task Force, a gap only partially filled by the Bosniac-Croat Federation's newly formed police force. The International Police Task Force, created under Annex XI of the Dayton Accords, is charged with implementing "a program of assistance." The task force does not fulfill the internal security role itself. Yet, internal security is not a mission for which military forces are particularly well suited, and all three national groups within Bosnia and Herzegovina are suspicious of the military performing police functions.

The police requirement is an example of the more general problems involved in transferring a conflict suppression function from international implementers to normal indigenous groups. In the near term, internal security should be entrusted to an armed international force organized from European police forces and serving under SFOR. At the same time, a multiethnic police academy should be established by Bosnia and Herzegovina and managed either by the International Police Task Force or by a private contractor. As classes are graduated from this academy and meet the standards established by the task force, they should be integrated into the armed international force and gradually assume the internal security functions. Initially, each entity will need its own police force; however, as reintegration of the entire Bosnian polity evolves, the two police forces can be merged, having undergone the same training and having met the same standards.

Likewise, every effort should be made to begin to develop a multiethnic military in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The constitution should be amended to allow for a national minister of defense and a joint staff representing both entities. This amendment would be an important step toward the re-establishment of a viable, multiethnic Bosnia and Herzegovina. Whatever the agreed-upon goals and objectives, they must be clearly articulated so that SFOR, OHR, and all the agencies and organizations associated with conflict prevention in Bosnia and Herzegovina can structure themselves accordingly.

#### **UNITY OF AUTHORITY AND INTEGRATION OF EFFORT**

If the transition from stabilization to normalization is to be completed successfully, the dual chains of command established by the United Nations—one military, the other civilian—must be brought together under a single, strategic-level CMIS.

**Table 1. Tasks to Be Carried Out Through Civilian-Military Coordination**

TASKS	MEASURES OF SUCCESS
1. Ensure the institutionalization of free and fair national, cantonal, and municipal elections (OHR, OSCE with SFOR support)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ At least two successful elections at all levels</li> <li>■ 60% participation</li> <li>■ No major incidents of violence</li> <li>■ Elected officials actually serve</li> <li>■ Democratic processes and procedures in place</li> </ul>
2. Ensure freedom of movement throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR, International Police Task Force)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ All checkpoints eliminated</li> <li>■ Single license plates issued</li> <li>■ Single passports issued</li> <li>■ No major incidents of ethnic harassment for six months</li> </ul>
3. Ensure freedom of the press (OHR, NGOs)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Multiple media outlets functioning</li> <li>■ No evidence of censorship or harassment</li> </ul>
4. Ensure ability of refugees to return to places of origin (OHR, UNHCR, NGOs)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Compensation mechanism in place and functioning</li> <li>■ Cantonal and municipal plans in place to facilitate return</li> <li>■ Bosnia and Herzegovina police enforcing rights of refugees to return</li> </ul>
5. Ensure cooperation with International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (OHR)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Both entities (Republika Srpska and the Bosniac-Croat Federation) committed</li> </ul>
6. Ensure compliance with arms control agreements (OSCE, SFOR)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Requirements of transformation and stabilization phases fully met by both entities</li> <li>■ Progress under way on subsequent agreements</li> </ul>

The United Nations should expand the scope of the authority of the North Atlantic Council to embrace the civilian as well as the military elements of implementation. This would require the Security Council to issue a new mandate, likely under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, specifying the North Atlantic Council as the coordinating body for all conflict prevention activities in Bosnia. In other words, the North Atlantic Council would become, in effect, the CMIS.

This proposal has the advantages of co-opting the established structures of the North Atlantic Council and NATO, and exploiting

**Table 1. (Continued)**

TASKS	MEASURES OF SUCCESS
7. Ensure development of effective police forces (SFOR, International Police Task Force, NGOs, private sector)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Police forces trained and operational in accordance with standards of International Police Task Force</li> <li>■ No major incidents of violence not adequately addressed by entity police forces</li> <li>■ Plan developed for national police force</li> </ul>
8. Ensure foundations for economic recovery and growth (OHR, World Bank, IMF, private sector)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Conditions met for IMF, World Bank loans and grants</li> <li>■ GNP restored to prewar levels</li> <li>■ Transportation/utilities infrastructure restored to prewar levels</li> <li>■ Budget processes of Republika Srpska, the Bosniac-Croat Federation, and the nation as a whole in accordance with Western standards</li> <li>■ Building international investment</li> </ul>
9. Ensure security and military stability of Republika Srpska and the Bosniac-Croat Federation (SFOR, private sector)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Confidence- and security-building measures agreed to and functioning</li> <li>■ Defense programs of each entity visible to the other</li> <li>■ No major incidents or threats involving military forces for 12 months</li> <li>■ Joint Military Commission operational</li> </ul>

*Note:* OHR = Office of the High Representative; OSCE = Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe; SFOR = Stabilization Force; UNHCR = UN High Commissioner for Refugees.

their experience in dealing with Bosnian affairs. Moreover, it focuses on the central role of the European community—whose member-states have the greatest interest in the future stability of the Balkans. In the post–Cold War years, NATO has developed the political and military structures that would enable it to assume the mission of political coordination. As for the North Atlantic Council, its policies and procedures have already stood the test of time.


This proposal would require non-UN organizations, such as the OSCE, to cooperate in different ways, perhaps subordinating certain on-

the-ground operations to the oversight of the North Atlantic Council. The NGOs, which carefully guard their autonomy from formal governmental structures, would also have to be willing to agree to coordinate with the North Atlantic Council. These issues must be addressed in the formal UN mandate through specific supporting requests to the international organizations, nations, and NGOs involved in the prevention of conflict in Bosnia.

An effective CMIS should also be created at the operational level—on the ground in Bosnia. This operational CMIS—let us call it CMIS-B—would be responsible for all conflict prevention activities and policies within Bosnia and Herzegovina. It would also be charged with coordinating the activities of organizations and individuals (including those from the private sector) that do not fit neatly under formal structures (see Figure 5).

The authority of CMIS-B would derive from the North Atlantic Council. Moreover, each participant in CMIS-B would coordinate directly with its parent organization within the strategic-level CMIS. This parallel reporting chain would ensure that coordination occurs both vertically—along formal organizational lines—and horizontally—across functional areas. Furthermore, CMIS-B would have to include active participation by representatives of both the Bosniac-Croat Federation and Republika Srpska.

The leadership of CMIS-B would depend upon the phase of the transition. During transformation and in the first stages of stabilization, the senior military commander in Bosnia, currently the commander of



**Figure 5.** A civilian-military implementation staff for Bosnia at the operational level.

SFOR, would lead the group. When conditions allow for the primary focus to shift to civilian implementation, and when the civilian staff is in place, leadership would pass to the High Representative. During normalization, leadership would remain with the High Representative until such time as the Bosnian government can assume the full range of its responsibilities. Then, during the final stages of normalization, the Bosnian government would assume full responsibility and the military and civilian international organizations would be reduced and withdrawn.

Clearly, issues of subordination must be addressed proactively and decisively; the need for integration, coordination, and unity of effort is too important to be left to *ad hoc* arrangements. The civilian representatives must be prepared to subordinate themselves to the military during implementation and stabilization, and the military must be ready to subordinate its activities to the High Representative in the last stages of stabilization and during normalization. To help address issues of subordination and to ensure complete integration of activities, the deputy chairman of CMIS-B should always be a civilian if the chairman is a military officer, and vice versa.

Essential to the success of CMIS-B would be a completely integrated staff—a combined joint task force that includes civilian and military staff at all levels, with key civilian and military staff officers within each staff section. Each participant would be assigned to a section depending upon individual and organizational expertise. At the tactical level, coordination teams could be formed under the aegis of CMIS-B and dispatched to appropriate locations for the necessary duration.

The private business sector deserves special mention in this discussion of unity of authority. Unlike participating nations, international organizations, and many NGOs, the business sector has no overarching, integrating structure and is motivated by goals and objectives that may or may not be congruent with those articulated by the United Nations and endorsed by the relevant players. Yet, the business sector has a crucial role to play in preventing the re-emergence of conflict in Bosnia.

Especially daunting is the challenge of coordinating the activities of private industry as it seeks investment opportunities and profits throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. While investment should be encouraged and supported, CMIS-B would have to coordinate such private sector activity—and ensure that it contributes to the overall promotion of peace—until the national government is fully restored. For this reason, CMIS-B's economic development staff section would become pivotal.

Finally, CMIS-B would have to work closely with the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the coordination and integration of activities. The host government assumes increasing responsibilities as the

postwar transition advances. After all, the final goal of international involvement is to pass all responsibilities associated with effective governance to an integrated, democratic, and multiethnic government of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bosnian authorities must be consulted as decisions are taken and implemented on fundamental policies. As much as possible, those authorities must begin to assume "ownership" for those decisions and be recognized as decision makers by the body politic that they represent.

#### **TIMELY POLITICAL DECISIONS AND INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENT**

A realignment of responsibilities as outlined above will facilitate timely political decision making on all issues. If it assumes the full range of implementation responsibilities, the North Atlantic Council will have to structure its decision-making processes on civilian matters to parallel those on military issues.

The keystone of successful conflict prevention in Bosnia—or, indeed, anywhere—is the requirement that all the relevant players commit themselves to stay the course. Having laid out general objectives, specific tasks, and measures of success, and having established the CMIS, the principal nations, organizations, and NGOs must define for themselves the limits of their involvement—in terms both of resources and time. As discussed above, a decision by one of the major players to end its participation based on criteria other than those dictated by the objectives, tasks, and measures of success will create troubling discontinuities in the postwar reconstruction.

At the same time, it is not necessary for players to make open-ended commitments. It is only necessary for them to identify what conditions will prompt or permit changes in their level of commitment, what the nature of their commitment will be during each phase, and what conditions will allow their eventual withdrawal.

#### **ROBUST AND REALISTIC RULES OF ENGAGEMENT**

The rules of engagement established by SACEUR for IFOR need to be extended throughout each phase of conflict suppression in Bosnia and Herzegovina. These have proven to be effective in maintaining the peace and protecting the peacekeepers, while ensuring that military implementation operates within the general objectives laid out in the Dayton Accords.

If, however, the mandate of SFOR is expanded to include the management of an international police force, the arrest of indicted war

criminals, or the forcible return of refugees, the rules of engagement will have to be changed to accommodate SFOR's new missions.

Rules of engagement will also have to be developed for the internal security forces that may be introduced into Bosnia. Like the rules of engagement for SFOR, those for internal security forces must be flexible and responsive, allowing the international police to deal with challenges to security as they emerge.

## BEYOND BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

The application of the four principles outlined here and the design of a CMIS are crucial for building the fragile Bosnian cease-fire into an enduring peace. These approaches to the task of orchestrating civilian and military aims and activities also have implications that extend far beyond Bosnia and Herzegovina, reaching into all corners of a world in which conflict prevention has become a central thrust of international security activities.

The operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina is important not only for the opportunity it presents to prevent conflict from re-emerging in that part of the Balkans, but also because it is the first out-of-area, operational mission undertaken by NATO. Clearly, NATO is as relevant today as it has been in the past, but in dramatically new ways. The success of NATO in Bosnia and Herzegovina will be of enormous significance in shaping the alliance for the challenges of Europe in the first decade of the twenty-first century. Beyond NATO, the international efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina represent a concerted effort to prevent the kinds of conflict that are likely to dominate the international system for the foreseeable future. Success in conflict prevention in Bosnia and Herzegovina thus becomes of central importance in honing techniques for conflict prevention in a host of other areas. In this respect, it is encouraging to note that 36 nations have cooperated in the operation in Bosnia to prevent renewed conflict and to rebuild a nation.

Success in conflict prevention in Bosnia and Herzegovina will buttress the credibility of the international community to effect the peaceful resolution of conflict throughout the world, but only if civilian and military leaders learn the right lessons and build their conflict prevention teams before and during the commitment of resources to a new operation. If we are to be serious about conflict prevention, we need to establish structures and procedures that will allow the international community to act quickly and decisively.

Notwithstanding the risks associated with drawing wide-ranging

conclusions from a particular case, we believe that the operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina points toward a number of valuable lessons for future conflict prevention. The following five observations and recommendations seem particularly pertinent.

1. *UN Organizational Preparations.* The role of the United Nations in preventing deadly conflict will expand in the future because there are no other means of establishing the necessary moral authority. Furthermore, there are certain kinds of conflict prevention operations that are amenable to direct management by the United Nations, particularly in the area of humanitarian missions.

Accordingly, the United Nations should establish a standing conflict prevention CMIS, including command and control, that would facilitate civilian-military cooperation in operations featuring direct UN involvement. The responsibilities of this CMIS would include analyzing potentially destabilizing developments throughout the world and preparing contingency plans for conflict prevention. Such contingency plans would not be exhaustive, but they would provide the foundation upon which the United Nations could build rapidly as a situation began to deteriorate. This CMIS would also provide the command and control for a UN rapid reaction force. As a first step, a cadre of CMIS staff should be created that can begin the process of planning and preparation.

2. *NATO Organizational Preparations.* Because of its geographical reach, membership, and organizational strengths, NATO should become the organization of choice to accomplish UN-mandated conflict prevention operations throughout Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. Moreover, the prospect of NATO membership and participation in the NATO-sponsored Partnership for Peace are powerful incentives for cooperation with NATO in conflict prevention. The Partnership for Peace program, which brings together most of the nations of Europe, provides an important forum for discussing and resolving issues of national security. It also provides a mechanism for cooperation among the military establishments of member states. In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, NATO should first offer membership in the program to both the Bosniac-Croat Federation and Republika Srpska; subsequently, a united Bosnia and Herzegovina could be considered for membership in NATO itself. The steps necessary to become a member of the Partnership for Peace—transparency of defense programs, commitment to democratic principles, and the like—provide yet another checklist for the evolution of peace and stability in Bosnia.

To fulfill the range of operations it may be asked to accomplish, however, NATO must adapt its organizational structure in a manner similar to that here proposed for the United Nations. Specifically, the North Atlantic Council should consider the following:

- Establishment of a standing CMIS located at SACEUR's headquarters and including a senior civilian leader. The purpose of creating a CMIS at this level is to prepare for the supervision and management of conflict prevention operations throughout NATO's area of interest. A combined joint planning staff (CJPS) already exists at SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe) and has been in contact with the High Representative and his staff in Sarajevo. It is now time to formalize the relationship. The CMIS would also be of use in operations directed by the Western European Union and in support of NATO's new Combined Joint Task Force initiative. Like its counterpart at the United Nations, the NATO CMIS staff would prepare contingency plans—this time in more detail. The staff in peacetime would be augmented during an actual conflict prevention operation by individuals chosen to meet the specific requirements of the mission.
- Expansion of the North Atlantic Council's interaction with the UN Security Council to ensure that preparations are in place for a rapid handoff of conflict prevention operations within NATO's area of interest. The recent establishment of several civilian-led committees at NATO's political headquarters in Brussels facilitates civilian political control and oversight of both military and civilian operations in Bosnia and elsewhere. With the North Atlantic Council involved and responsible for an integrated civilian–military plan, unity of command and unity of effort will be achieved—and there will be a higher probability of success in managing resources and accomplishing overall political objectives.

3. *Exercises.* At both the United Nations and NATO, a series of exercises should be developed and conducted to hone and focus the abilities of the CMIS at the strategic and operational levels. Insofar as political sensitivities allow, these exercises should be built around real world scenarios. Such exercises, and the contingency plans they support, will facilitate a timely response to the rapid-fire demands of conflict prevention worldwide.

4. *National and International Imprimaturs.* The effectiveness of the CMIS at any level is a function of the willingness of various international organizations, NGOs, and the business sector to surrender some measure of their autonomy to the CMIS. The United Nations and

NATO should begin consultations with as many of these organizations as possible to explain the concept of the CMIS, the rationale for cooperation, and the specific requirements of the CMIS.

5. *Rules of Engagement.* The rules of engagement established for Bosnia and Herzegovina—which have been approved by the 16 nations of NATO and are currently being used by 20 other nations—provide a useful model for rules of engagement in other environments. Indeed, when Western forces were assigned to the evacuation of Albania, the Bosnia rules of engagement were adopted virtually without modification. Although they may not be applicable everywhere, these rules of engagement provide a useful starting point and can be tailored to suit a specific environment.

## CONCLUSION

As the world grapples with the challenges of international security in the new century, peace operations and the prevention of deadly conflict are moving to center stage. In an increasingly interdependent global environment in which intrastate violence has become more common than interstate warfare, the international community cannot afford to remain on the sidelines while violence takes its course. The analytical scheme outlined in this paper, and the proposals for its implementation, are intended to provide a means by which the international community can begin to come to grips with current challenges in a pragmatic, decisive fashion. A realistic, proactive approach to preventing deadly conflict, buttressed by structures and procedures that facilitate conflict prevention operations, is of central importance to the evolution of the international system and to peace and security in the years ahead.

---

---

## NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Most conflict prevention operations focus on the second and third cases; seldom has the international community been successful in acting to prevent a conflict before it begins. An important contemporary exception to this has been the UN preventive deployment (UNPREDEP) in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. UNPREDEP was a significant factor in preventing the spread of instability and violence into Macedonia, giving the Macedonians the opportunity to develop their independence in a peaceful environment.

2. The terms of the Versailles Treaty were not entirely draconian. Henry Kissinger describes them as “too punitive for conciliation, too lenient to keep Germany from recovering.” See Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Shuster, 1994), p. 239. Indeed, Versailles became a rallying cry for the Nazis primarily because of the national humiliation it inflicted, rather than because of the economic burdens it imposed. Ironically, much of the war reparations Germany paid to France and Britain was funded by the United States under the Dawes Plan—an early U.S. effort to prevent a renewal of deadly conflict. See Joachim C. Fest, *Hitler* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1974), p. 82; and Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, p. 272.

3. In both Germany and Japan, the aftermath of unconditional surrender left the United States in a position to dictate the composition, structure, and behavior of postwar governments. Such an opportunity to construct another country’s government is rare, especially in the last years of the twentieth century.

4. Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, *Preventing Deadly Conflict: Final Report* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1997), p. xviii.

5. This is analogous to the military's three levels of conflict and is a useful typology for management of a variety of activities. In military parlance, the strategic level of conflict employs all elements of power—diplomatic, economic, military, informational, and psychological—in support of broad national objectives. The operational level involves all military actions taken at the national or theater level to support strategic objectives. At the tactical level, the battles are fought.

6. United Nations, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-Keeping* (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996), p. 290.

7. Somalia: UNOSOM II, United Nations Department of Public Information, New York, 21 March 1997 (<http://www.un.org/dpko> [see "Completed Missions"]).

8. This view is most explicitly embodied in the Weinberger Doctrine that outlined six criteria for the commitment of U.S. forces. See Caspar W. Weinberger, "The Uses of Military Power," *Defense* 88 (January 1985): 7–9.

9. Alexander L. George and Jane E. Holl, *The Warning-Response Problem and Missed Opportunities in Preventive Diplomacy* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1997).

10. Periodically, there are accusations that the Bosnian army itself mortared the marketplace in order to blame the Serbs and rally international action. Even in the labyrinth of Balkan politics, this is not supported by the preponderance of evidence.

11. "Conclusions of the Peace Implementation Council Conference Held at Lancaster House," Office of the High Representative Document, 9 December 1995.

12. General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP), Annex I-A, Article VI. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 11 December 1995.

13. General Framework Agreement for Peace, Annex 10, Article I.

14. As conceived by the Dayton Accords and endorsed by UN Security Council Resolution 1302.

15. No one involved in the official General Framework Agreement for Peace and UN Security Council mandates knew quite what to do with the company MPRI—the contractor hired to carry out the Train and Equip program. While MPRI busied itself designing the Ministry of Defense and the Army of the Federation (AOF), training the AOF units, and developing programs for the transition to democracy, it was neither consulted nor integrated into the efforts of other conflict prevention organizations.

16. As SACEUR, I (GJ) made clear that cooperation with the High Representative was crucial to success. OPLAN 0405, issued in December 1995, stated:

There will be a High Representative appointed to coordinate the civilian aspects of the implementation plan. There will be a rapid deployment of IFOR to Bosnia and Herzegovina. There is also the need for the High Representative and his staff to match this rapid deployment and become operational as quickly as possible in order to coordinate the many UN and civilian agencies and NGOs already in country. The military implementation plan and the civilian implementation plan must complement each other. Clearly, military planning is currently more advanced than the civilian plan and, therefore, every attempt should be made to develop quickly the civilian aspects of the peace agreement. Since IFOR has 12 months to complete its mission, the rapid organization and functioning of the High Representative and civilian agencies are essential to success. While the High Representative will have no command authority over IFOR and will not interfere with the military aspects of the plan, I expect a strong and continuous relationship and liaison with the High Representative and civilian agencies.

17. NATO envisioned that IFOR would operate in close coordination with the Office of the High Representative (OHR). The North Atlantic Council understood that coordination between the military and civilian organizations was essential if the conditions were to be created that would allow the withdrawal of the NATO forces. As SACEUR, I (GJ) was clear: the civilian side must take over the implementation of the civilian aspects of the peace as a precondition for NATO's exit strategy. Accordingly, I directed my forces to consider requests to provide assistance to civil agencies, although this was a supporting task subordinate to the primary mission of implementing the military aspects of the accords with which NATO had been charged.

I clearly understood the requirements for an effective civilian–military interface, but also anticipated that the OHR would be slow in getting its operations up and running. This was an unsurprising conclusion considering the fact that the OHR had to be created from whole cloth and that the civilian agencies that the OHR was supposed to coordinate had no focused organization for Bosnia themselves.

This prediction proved true; although the High Representative was appointed on 15 December 1995, he did not arrive in Sarajevo until January 1996, fully 30 days after the commitment of the NATO-led IFOR. Moreover, OHR did not achieve an operational capability in Bosnia and Herzegovina until the summer of 1996—fully six months after the beginning of the initiation phase. Even then, the High Representative had to work to integrate the civilian agencies without the formal authority to do so. The problems in working under such conditions were seen in a host of areas. For example, within the realm of human rights, the OHR established the Human Rights Coordination Centre—an informal effort to exchange relevant information. But, because coordination was voluntary, it was also sporadic and self-serving. OHR had neither the authority nor a mechanism for requiring integration among the organizations and agencies involved in implementing the civilian aspects of the accords.

18. I (GJ) reported this conclusion to the North Atlantic Council in June 1996 and made it clear that while the military aspects of the Dayton Accords would be satisfied by the end of the mandate, persistent problems on the civilian side would prevent the consolidation of the peace. In anticipation of political decisions, I then directed my staff to prepare for a follow-on military force to be in place at the end of IFOR's mandate.

At the same time, IFOR stepped up its efforts to establish some measure of effective coordination with the civilian agencies and OHR at the operational level. Initially, IFOR established the Principal's Group, which was expanded as more civilian agencies arrived in Bosnia and began operations.

Some measure of coordinated progress was made as IFOR and civilian implementation organizations began to focus on the September 1996 national elections—an event of great domestic significance and international symbolism. The OSCE, charged by the Dayton Accords with the responsibility to supervise and oversee the elections, became quickly overwhelmed by the magnitude of the task and the security arrangements necessary to ensure fair and peaceful elections. Ambassador Robert Frowick turned to IFOR for assistance, and what would prove to be the most detailed tasking, execution, and coordination operation of the first year in Bosnia was developed. As a result of this high degree of coordination and interaction, the national elections in September were conducted in a peaceful manner, with a high level of voter turnout.

Such success stories were not the norm, however. When I suggested that the election model of civilian–military planning be adopted on a more universal scale, the High Representative declined to do so.

In this environment, the effectiveness of the Principal's Group was severely limited by its lack of a formal mandate and authority. It derived its coordination role strictly from the informal agreements struck among the various participating agencies and organizations. Moreover, it included none of the NGOs that were now proliferating throughout the length and breadth of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and it kept the private company charged with managing the Train and Equip program at arm's length.

By the end of year one, IFOR had accomplished a great deal in realizing the least complex of the Dayton requirements. Among IFOR's achievements were:

- Successful execution of the first out-of-area mission of NATO
- Integration of the military efforts of 36 nations—NATO and non-NATO
- Prevention of a “spring offensive” by either Republika Srpska or the Bosniac-Croat Federation.
- Establishment of a thoroughly integrated combined joint task force, including participation by 25 nations
- Establishment of a viable system for operational control over Russian forces by IFOR

19. With this guidance and the specific tasks assigned by the North Atlantic Council, SFOR was sized at about 30,000 troops—down from IFOR's 60,000. Had the North Atlantic Council

directed me (GJ) as SACEUR to accomplish any or all of the tasks mentioned above, a much larger force would have been required. With the North Atlantic Council's guidance and assigned tasks, SHAPE produced OPLAN 10406—"Operation Joint Guard." In the OPLAN, NATO identified specific tasks for SFOR:

SFOR will assist in the creation of an environment that shifts responsibility for maintaining the peace from military enforcement to political and civil control, with the Bosnia and Herzegovina participants themselves assuming increasing responsibility for the maintenance of the peace. (OPLAN 10406, "Joint Guard," Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe, December 1996, p. 2.)

The plan further defined the end-state conditions that would allow NATO military forces to be withdrawn. These included all parties adhering to the military requirements of the General Framework Agreement for Peace, all parties demonstrating commitment to negotiations, civil structures sufficiently mature to assume responsibility, and nation-building activities well under way.

20. "Final Communiqué," Ministerial Meeting of the Peace Implementation Council Steering Board, Sintra, Portugal, 30 May 1997.

21. In December 1996, I (GJ) reminded the North Atlantic Council that "the efforts of the international community will be in vain if the entities themselves cannot agree to compromise and work together" ("Operational Assessment—Operation Joint Guard," memorandum for the Secretary-General and the North Atlantic Council from SACEUR, 20 December 1996). Indeed, for much of 1997, the Bosnian Serbs were consumed with their own internal strife as the factions of President Biljana Plavsic and accused war criminal Radovan Karadzic struggled for dominance. SFOR was committed on the side of the democratically elected Plavsic and, for the first time, became directly involved in factional turmoil. In May 1997 NATO forces intervened when Serb police from Pale attempted to arrest or kill Plavsic. At this time, I directed that SFOR place the Serb police under the same controls as the Republika Srpska Army.

By spring 1997 it was evident that the United States was growing weary of its involvement in an area remote from American shores and outside NATO's historical orbit. En route to his visit to Bosnia and Herzegovina in March, Secretary of Defense William Cohen announced, "It's very clear that in June of 1998, we'll be on our way out. We're not prepared to make a commitment for perpetuity. Are they going to go back to slaughtering each other? That's going to be up to them."

This pledge of unconditional withdrawal had an enormous effect both on the international community and within Bosnia and Herzegovina itself. Indeed, the United States spent much of the next six months reshaping Cohen's remarks and redefining the conditions under which the United States would end its involvement. National Security Advisor Sandy Berger laid out the official administration position in September: "If Dayton fails . . . it would throw into question America's leadership in Europe with grave consequences for our people and other freedom-loving people around the world" (Sandy Berger, remarks delivered at Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., 23 September 1997; available from Federal Document Clearing House, Inc.). The implications were clear: the United States would remain even after the expiration of the SFOR mandate.

The extent and durability of the American—and the NATO—commitment to Bosnia and Herzegovina remain to be seen. But it is clear that continued U.S. engagement in the Balkans is vital for the Europeans to follow suit. The challenge will be for the United States to consult, not merely to inform; to lead, not just to react.

22. One of the most poignant examples of the absence of focus is the condition of the Bosnian city of Srebrenica two and a half years after the signing of the Dayton Accords. The ethnic cleansing of Srebrenica became a focal point for the international community as it rallied to bring the war in Bosnia to an end. But, because of the inability of the High Representative to focus the efforts of the international agencies and NGOs, Srebrenica remained without water, a reliable electricity supply, and other basic services into the spring of 1998 and beyond. The only relief provided was through the *ad hoc* efforts of the local SFOR commander—and those efforts were beyond the scope of his mandate.

---

---

## MEMBERS OF THE CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON PREVENTING DEADLY CONFLICT

David A. Hamburg, *Cochair*  
President Emeritus  
Carnegie Corporation of New York

Cyrus R. Vance, *Cochair*  
Partner  
Simpson Thacher & Bartlett

Gro Harlem Brundtland  
Director-General  
World Health Organization  
Former Prime Minister of Norway

Virendra Dayal  
Former Under-Secretary-General and  
Chef de Cabinet to the Secretary-General  
United Nations

Gareth Evans  
Deputy Leader of the Opposition  
and Shadow Treasurer  
Australia

Alexander L. George  
Graham H. Stuart Professor Emeritus  
of International Relations  
Stanford University

Flora MacDonald  
Former Foreign Minister of Canada

Donald F. McHenry  
Distinguished Professor in the Practice  
of Diplomacy  
School of Foreign Service  
Georgetown University

Olara A. Otunnu  
President  
International Peace Academy

David Owen  
House of Lords

Shridath Ramphal  
Cochairman  
Commission on Global Governance

Roald Z. Sagdeev  
Distinguished Professor  
Department of Physics  
University of Maryland

John D. Steinbruner  
Senior Fellow  
Foreign Policy Studies Program  
The Brookings Institution

Brian Urquhart  
Former Under-Secretary-General  
for Special Political Affairs  
United Nations

John C. Whitehead  
Chairman  
AEA Investors Inc.

Sahabzada Yaqub-Khan  
Former Foreign Minister of Pakistan  
Chairman, Board of Trustees  
Aga Khan International University-Karachi

*Special Advisors to the Commission*  
Arne Olav Brundtland  
World Trade Organization  
Former Director  
Studies in Foreign and Security Policy  
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs

Herbert S. Okun  
Visiting Lecturer on International Law  
Yale Law School  
Former U.S. Representative to the  
German Democratic Republic  
and to the UN

Jane E. Holl, *Executive Director*

---

---

## MEMBERS OF THE ADVISORY COUNCIL

Morton Abramowitz Former President Carnegie Endowment for International Peace	Lawrence S. Eagleburger Senior Foreign Policy Advisor Baker Donelson Bearman and Caldwell
Ali Abdullah Alatas Minister for Foreign Affairs Republic of Indonesia	Leslie H. Gelb President Council on Foreign Relations
Graham T. Allison Director Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs Harvard University	David Gompert Vice President National Security Research RAND
Robert Badinter Senator of Hauts de Seine, Senat	Andrew J. Goodpaster Senior Fellow The Eisenhower World Affairs Institute
Carol Bellamy Executive Director UNICEF	Mikhail S. Gorbachev The Gorbachev Foundation
Harold Brown Counselor Center for Strategic and International Studies	James P. Grant <sup>†</sup> Executive Director UNICEF
McGeorge Bundy* Scholar-in-Residence Carnegie Corporation of New York	Lee H. Hamilton United States House of Representatives
Jimmy Carter Chairman The Carter Center	Theodore M. Hesburgh President Emeritus University of Notre Dame
Lori Damrosch Professor of Law Columbia University School of Law	Donald L. Horowitz James B. Duke Professor of Law and Political Science Duke University School of Law
Francis M. Deng Senior Fellow Foreign Policy Studies Program The Brookings Institution	Michael Howard President International Institute for Strategic Studies
Sidney D. Drell Professor and Deputy Director Stanford Linear Accelerator Center Stanford University	* Deceased September 1996. † Deceased February 1995.

Karl Kaiser Director Research Institute of the German Society for Foreign Affairs	Condoleezza Rice Provost Stanford University
Nancy Landon Kassebaum Baker United States Senate (Ret.)	Elliot L. Richardson Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy
Sol M. Linowitz Honorary Chairman The Academy for Educational Development	Harold H. Saunders Director of International Affairs Kettering Foundation
Richard G. Lugar United States Senate	George P. Shultz Distinguished Fellow Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace Stanford University
Michael Mandelbaum Christian A. Herter Professor of American Foreign Policy The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies The Johns Hopkins University	Richard Solomon President United States Institute of Peace
Robert S. McNamara Former U.S. Secretary of Defense	James Gustave Speth Administrator United Nations Development Programme
William H. McNeill Professor Emeritus of History University of Chicago	Desmond Tutu Archbishop Emeritus of Cape Town
Sam Nunn Partner King & Spalding	Admiral James D. Watkins, USN (Ret.) Secretary of Energy, 1989–1993
Olusegun Obasanjo Former Head of State of Nigeria President Africa Leadership Forum	Elie Wiesel Nobel Laureate Andrew W. Mellon Professor in the Humanities Boston University
Sadako Ogata The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees	I. William Zartman Jacob Blaustein Professor of International Organizations and Conflict Resolution Director of African Studies and Conflict Management Programs The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies The Johns Hopkins University
Javier Pérez de Cuéllar Former Secretary-General United Nations	

---

---

## ABOUT THE AUTHORS

**George A. Joulwan** was Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) during the transitions of the NATO alliance in the mid-1990s. For 18 months he was the overall military commander for the NATO-led Implementation and Stabilization Forces executing the Dayton Peace Accords in Bosnia. In addition, he was directly involved in establishing the Partnership for Peace program and also furthered cooperation efforts with Russia, which were the basis for the NATO–Russian Founding Act signed in May 1997. A 1961 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, General Joulwan served two combat tours in Vietnam with the 1<sup>st</sup> Infantry Division and the 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne Division. During six years in Washington he served in the Pentagon as director of requirements for the Army and executive officer for the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and in the White House as a special assistant to the president. General Joulwan also served as the commander in chief of U.S. forces in Central and South America and as commander in chief of the United States European Command.

**Christopher C. Shoemaker** is vice president of MPRI, a firm based in Alexandria, Virginia, specializing in transition to democracy, governmental and defense structure, and issues of national security. From 1996 to 1997 he was director of Force Integration, Military Stabilization Program in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. A graduate of West Point, with a PhD from the University of Florida, he served more than 20 years in the U.S. Army, with assignments ranging from brigade command to the staff of the National Security Council. He is the author of several books and numerous articles on international politics and foreign policy.

---

---

## PUBLICATION ORDER FORM

To order a free report or to be added to the Commission's mailing list, please mail or fax this form to: **Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1779 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Suite 715, Washington, DC 20036-2103; Phone: (202) 332-7900; Fax: (202) 332-1919.** You may also order by e-mail: [pdc@carnegie.org](mailto:pdc@carnegie.org)

- David A. Hamburg, *Preventing Contemporary Intergroup Violence*, April 1994.
- David A. Hamburg, *Education for Conflict Resolution*, April 1995.
- Comprehensive Disclosure of Fissionable Materials: A Suggested Initiative*, June 1995.
- Larry Diamond, *Promoting Democracy in the 1990s: Actors and Instruments, Issues and Imperatives*, December 1995.
- Andrew J. Goodpaster, *When Diplomacy Is Not Enough: Managing Multinational Military Interventions*, July 1996.
- John Stremlau, *Sharpening International Sanctions: Toward a Stronger Role for the United Nations*, November 1996.
- Alexander L. George and Jane E. Holl, *The Warning-Response Problem and Missed Opportunities in Preventive Diplomacy*, May 1997.
- John Stremlau with Helen Zille, *A House No Longer Divided: Progress and Prospects for Democratic Peace in South Africa*, July 1997.
- Nik Gowing, *Media Coverage: Help or Hindrance in Conflict Prevention*, September 1997.
- Cyrus R. Vance and David A. Hamburg, *Pathfinders for Peace: A Report to the UN Secretary-General on the Role of Special Representatives and Personal Envoys*, September 1997.
- Preventing Deadly Conflict: Executive Summary of the Final Report*, December 1997.
- Gail W. Lapidus with Svetlana Tsalik, eds., *Preventing Deadly Conflict: Strategies and Institutions*, Proceedings of a Conference in Moscow, Russian Federation, April 1998.
- Douglas E. Lute, *Improving National Capacity to Respond to Complex Emergencies: The U.S. Experience*, April 1998.
- Scott R. Feil, *Preventing Genocide: How the Early Use of Force Might Have Succeeded in Rwanda*, April 1998.
- John Stremlau, *People in Peril: Human Rights, Humanitarian Action, and Preventing Deadly Conflict*, May 1998.
- John Stremlau and Francisco R. Sagasti, *Preventing Deadly Conflict: Does the World Bank Have a Role?* July 1998.
- Tom Gelten, *Professionalism in War Reporting: A Correspondent's View*. Report to the Commission, July 1998.
- Edward J. Laurance, *Light Weapons and Intrastate Conflict: Early Warning Factors and Preventive Action*, August 1998.
- Donald Kennedy, *Environmental Quality and Regional Conflict*, December 1998.
- George A. Joulwan and Christopher C. Shoemaker, *Civilian-Military Cooperation in the Prevention of Deadly Conflict: Implementing Agreements in Bosnia and Beyond*, December 1998.
- Essays on Leadership* (by Boutros Boutros-Ghali, George Bush, Jimmy Carter, Mikhail Gorbachev, and Desmond Tutu), December 1998.

Name \_\_\_\_\_

Title \_\_\_\_\_ Institution \_\_\_\_\_

Address \_\_\_\_\_

Phone \_\_\_\_\_ Fax \_\_\_\_\_ E-mail \_\_\_\_\_

To order *Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts* by Timothy Sisk, copublished by the Commission and the United States Institute of Peace Press, please contact USIP Press at P.O. Box 605, Herndon, VA 22070, USA; Phone: 1-800-868-8064 or 1-703-661-1590. The cost is \$7.95 plus tax and shipping.

To order *Bridging the Gap: A Future Security Architecture for the Middle East; The Price of Peace: Incentives and International Conflict Prevention; Sustainable Peace: The Role of the UN and Regional Organizations in Preventing Conflict; Turkey's Kurdish Question; and The Costs of Conflict: Prevention and Cure in the Global Arena*, books in the Commission series published by Rowman & Littlefield, please contact the publisher at 1-800-462-6420 or 1-301-459-3366.

## PUBLICATIONS OF THE CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON PREVENTING DEADLY CONFLICT

The following reports are available free of charge from the Commission, or on the Commission's World Wide Web site: <http://www.ccpdc.org>

David A. Hamburg, *Preventing Contemporary Intergroup Violence*. Founding Essay of the Commission. April 1994.

David A. Hamburg, *Education for Conflict Resolution*. April 1995.

*Comprehensive Disclosure of Fissionable Materials: A Suggested Initiative*. Discussion Paper. June 1995.

Larry Diamond, *Promoting Democracy in the 1990s: Actors and Instruments, Issues and Imperatives*. Report to the Commission. December 1995.

Andrew J. Goodpaster, *When Diplomacy Is Not Enough: Managing Multinational Military Interventions*. Report to the Commission. July 1996.

John Stremlau, *Sharpening International Sanctions: Toward a Stronger Role for the United Nations*. Report to the Commission. November 1996.

Alexander L. George and Jane E. Holl, *The Warning-Response Problem and Missed Opportunities in Preventive Diplomacy*. Report to the Commission. May 1997.

John Stremlau with Helen Zille, *A House No Longer Divided: Progress and Prospects for Democratic Peace in South Africa*. Report to the Commission. July 1997.

Nik Gowing, *Media Coverage: Help or Hindrance in Conflict Prevention*. Report to the Commission. September 1997.

Cyrus R. Vance and David A. Hamburg, *Pathfinders for Peace: A Report to the UN Secretary-General on the Role of Special Representatives and Personal Envoys*. Report of the Commission. September 1997.

*Preventing Deadly Conflict: Executive Summary of the Final Report*. Report of the Commission. December 1997.

Gail W. Lapidus with Svetlana Tsalik, eds., *Preventing Deadly Conflict: Strategies and Institutions*. Proceedings of a Conference in Moscow, Russian Federation. Report to the Commission. April 1998.

Douglas E. Lute, *Improving National Capacity to Respond to Complex Emergencies: The U.S. Experience*. Report to the Commission. April 1998.

Scott R. Feil, *Preventing Genocide: How the Early Use of Force Might Have Succeeded in Rwanda*. Report to the Commission. April 1998.

John Stremlau, *People in Peril: Human Rights, Humanitarian Action, and Preventing Deadly Conflict*. Report to the Commission. May 1998.

John Stremlau and Francisco Sagasti, *Preventing Deadly Conflict: Does the World Bank Have a Role?* Report to the Commission. July 1998.

Tom Gjelten, *Professionalism in War Reporting: A Correspondent's View*. Report to the Commission. July 1998.

Edward J. Laurance, *Light Weapons and Intrastate Conflict: Early Warning Factors and Preventive Action*. Report to the Commission. August 1998.

Donald Kennedy, *Environmental Quality and Regional Conflict*. Report to the Commission. December 1998.

George A. Joulwan and Christopher C. Shoemaker, *Civilian-Military Cooperation in the Prevention of Deadly Conflict: Implementing Agreements in Bosnia and Beyond*. Report to the Commission. December 1998.

*Essays on Leadership* (by Boutros Boutros-Ghali, George Bush, Jimmy Carter, Mikhail Gorbachev, and Desmond Tutu). December 1998.

*Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts*, a 1996 report to the Commission by Timothy Sisk, is copublished by the Commission and the United States Institute of Peace. Please contact USIP Press at P.O. Box 605, Herndon, VA 22070, USA; Phone: 1-800-868-8064 or 1-703-661-1590. The cost is \$7.95 plus tax and shipping.

*Bridging the Gap: A Future Security Architecture for the Middle East; The Price of Peace: Incentives and International Conflict Prevention; Sustainable Peace: The Role of the UN and Regional Organizations in Preventing Conflict; Turkey's Kurdish Question; and The Costs of Conflict: Prevention and Cure in the Global Arena* are books in the Commission series published by Rowman & Littlefield. Please contact the publisher at 1-800-462-6420 or 1-301-459-3366.